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This thesis classifies changes most likely to have an 
impact on naval aviation maintenance through the year 2000,  
and describes planning mechanisms currently in place to deal 
with these changes. 
level aviation maintenance managers concerning the planning 
and change process, a variety of comments and problem areas 
are listed. Conclusions indicate a need to place greater 
emphasis on long-range (strategic) planning, while ensuring 
clarity-of-purpose both within the naval aviation maintenance 
organizational structure and the Aeronautical Maintenance 
Duty Officer community. 
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Highly complex weapons systems and equipments are the 
result of modern strategies and tactics. Aircraft and equip- 
ment performance requirements and operating conditions are 
increasingly demanding while development schedules are tight 
and funds are often limited. As a result, modern military 
hardware is highly complex and continually stressing the 
"state-of-the-art. I t  Combat aircraft, on the average, have 
experienced a tenfold increase in production costs every 15 
years. 
ownership costs increase. Cost, complexity of weapons s y s -  
tems, and the criticality of resource management are major 
factors driving change. In light of these considerations, 
the aviation maintenance management system must prepare for 
change without, at the same time, becoming overloaded with 
marginal value functions and complexities. 
At the same time, mission-capable rates decrease and 
Obviously, aviation maintenance is of predominate impor- 
tance in the attainment of the overall goal of naval aviation 
The successful operation of complex maintenance activities 
requires expert, innovative management at all levels. Effec-  
tive aircraft maintenance is a combination of many factors, 
not the least of which is proper planning, change implementa- 
tion and efficient utilization of assets. 
9 
The evolution of aircraft and their systems, overtime, 
has intensified the demand for improved maintenance manage- 
ment. The evolution of maintenance management is embodied in 
the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) which,in its 
implemented over present form,is the culmination of changes 
the years. 
B. SCOPE AND APPROACH 
This thesis attempts o ser as a forim for suggestions 
which could lead t o  improvement of the current planning and 
change process. 
stimulate thought and discussion within the naval aviation 
Additionally, this study is intended to 
maintenance management community regarding the many planning 
and change issues facing naval aviation maintenance now, and 
as it prepares for the future. 
The future of naval aviation maintenance cannot be assessed 
without first projecting the future of naval aviation in 
general. Chapter I1 provides insight into the scope and 
degree of change which is likely to take place both in sea- 
based naval aviation in general and in Naval Aviation Mainte- 
nance in particular. 
Chapter I11 provides a general discussion of some o f  the 
long-range planning processes currently in place within the 
naval aviation community, as well as the organizational/ 
procedural processes through which naval aviation maintenance 
prepares for and implements change. 
10 
Chapter IV is a compilation of the views of senior level 
maintenance managers concerning the planning and change process. 
Of some concern is the question of adequacy of data and the 
level of objectivity attained from this data. The response 
vehicle utilized was a questionnaire (Appendix A),designed to 
anonymously solicit the candid views, concerns, and sugges- 
tions of senior level maintenance managers. Subject areas 
focused upon were: the futuristic aspects of naval aviation 
maintenance, current planning and change processes, impediments 
to change, and methods for improvement of the change process. 
The responses, covering a multitude of concerns and issues, 
were exceptionally candid. Although the feedback is consid- 
ered valid, it does not represent the official views of the 
Navy Department. 
Chapter V summarizes and concludes findings based on 
deductive reasoning. Areas requiring further study are 
identified. 
11. THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE 
A. NAVAL AVIATION FOR THE FUTURE: DISCUSSION 
1. Mission 
DoD and the Navy agree on the following set of naval 
miss ions : 
- -  To deter nuclear war 
- -  To maintain a worldwide naval presence 
- -  To contain crises: 
by superiority at sea 
by projection ashore 
- -  To be able to protect ships at sea 
- -  To be able to reinforce our allies 
- -  To be able to place pressure against the Soviets. 
Disagreement lies in the assessment of risk and of 
the fighting ability of the naval forces we can construct 
with the budgets we anticipate. [Ref. 1: p. 681 
Broadly defined, the mission of the U.S. Navy is to 
be ready to conduct immediate and sustained combat operations 
at sea in support of our national interests. 
be able to defeat the potential threats to its continued free 
use of the high seas whether the threat be hostile aircraft, 
surface ships, and/or submarines. 
The Navy must 
[Ref. 2 :  p. 191 
According to Admiral Stansfield Turner: 
"It would be very unwise to build the U.S. Navy on the 
assumption that we can predict whether a war will be long 
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o r  s h o r t .  That cho ice  may v e r y  w e l l  n o t  be o u r s  t o  make. 
I f  t h a t  e s t i m a t e  should  prove wrong, and i f  t h e  Navy were 
n o t  ready  t o  m a i n t a i n  a s u s t a i n e d  sea c o n t r o l  e f f o r t ,  t h e  
c o u n t r y ' s  b a s i c  s e c u r i t y  would be a t  r i s k .  A l l  Ch ie f s  of  
Naval O p e r a t i o n s ,  a l l  S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  Defense know i n  t h e i r  
i n n e r  r e c e s s e s  t h a t  be ing  a b l e  t o  meet the t h r e a t  t o  ou r  
use  o f  t h e  s e a  i s  t h e  c o r e  r eason  f o r  having a navy. And 
i f  war comes, t h e y  w i l l  n o t  be l i k e l y  t o  d i v e r t  t h e  Navy 
t o  any o t h e r  t a s k  u n t i l  t h i s  key i s s u e  i s  r e so lved . "  
[Ref.  3:  p.  661  
Admiral Turner  f u r t h e r  s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  Navy cannot  
be des igned  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  requi rements  of s e a  c o n t r o l  a l o n e ,  
even i f  i t  i s  t h e  h i g h e s t  p r i o r i t y  mis s ion .  Power p r o j e c t i o n  
may be  of  l esser  consequence t h a n  s e a  c o n t r o l  b u t  w e  may be 
c a l l e d  upon more f r e q u e n t l y  t o  c a r r y  i t  o u t .  C a r r i e r s  have 
been u t i l i z e d  mainly i n  power p r o j e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  p a s t  3 5  
y e a r s .  Today and f o r  t h e  f o r e s e e a b l e  f u t u r e ,  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  w i l l  have c r i t i c a l  n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  Ind ian  
Ocean which must be p r o t e c t e d .  The absence of  l and  bases  
exc ludes  such o p t i o n s  a s  i n - p l a c e  a rmies  o r  a i r  f o r c e s .  The 
Navy p r e s e n t s  t h e  s i n g l e  means of  p o s i t i o n i n g  f o r c e s  i n  prox-  
i m i t y  t o  t h i s  v i t a l  r e g i o n  and p r o v i d e s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  respond 
t o  c r i s e s  q u i c k l y  and t o  t h e  degree  warran ted  by t h e  c i r cums tances .  
[Ref.  3:  p .  671  
Desp i t e  t h e  importance of  s e a  c o n t r o l ,  s i n c e  World 
War I1 t h e  on ly  combatant u se  of  t h e  U.S.  Navy has been i n  
power p r o j e c t i o n  i n  t h e  Th i rd  World. 
do n o t  ag ree  t h a t  c a r r i e r s  are  e s s e n t i a l  t o  winning t h e  b a t t l e  
There a r e  t h o s e  who 
f o r  s e a  c o n t r o l .  Too o f t e n  s e a  c o n t r o l  i s  r e l e g a t e d  t o  P - 3  
p a t r o l  p l a n e s ,  d e s t r o y e r s  and submarines .  [Ref. 3 :  p .  661  
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Naval aviation is the primary element in protecting 
our convoys and military forces at sea; to denying free use 
of the sea to an enemy; and to projecting power by means of 
amphibious assault and air strikes. 
aviation for the future there must be a strategic concept, 
an objective, an understanding of what aviation must be pre- 
pared to do in the next twenty years. 
aviation play in sea control? 
projection? 
ing the needs of both functions? 
In order to prepare naval 
What part will naval 
What part will it play in power 
Will we have an aviation Navy capable of fulfill- 
[Ref. 3 :  p .  661 
2 .  Platforms 
a. The Aircraft Carrier 
The aircraft carrier represents an essential unit 
of the defense posture of the United States. 
tial general-purpose weapon system enabling the Navy to carry 
out the sea control mission of ensuring freedom of use of 
critical sea lanes. The aircraft carrier is the primary ele- 
ment of powerful, mobile battle forces made up of antisubma- 
rine, fighter and attack aircraft, surface combatants, and 
nuclear submarines. In any comparison of the United States 
Navy to the Soviet Navy, the measure of difference between 
the two fleets is the sea based air power of the United States 
carrier force,which provides the United States Navy with what 
is currently a slight margin of superiority. 
of a sea based tactical air arm is realized by the Soviet 
It is the essen- 
The significance 
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Navy, in that it has commenced construction of a large-deck, 
nuclear aircraft carrier. [Ref. 4: p. 4-3(u)] 
Aircraft carriers are exceptionally mobile air 
bases that can move from area to area, providing a wide range 
of military capabilities. 
the political disadvantages and deployment constraints associ- 
ated with land based air units or ground troops. The aircraft 
carrier is versatile and can be employed in a wide range of 
conflict including: The maintenance of a political presence 
in peace time, operations in limited war and general nuclear 
warfare. Through substantial logistic self-sufficiency, the 
aircraft carrier can maintain its readiness posture for long 
periods at distant trouble spots. 
They are able to do this without 
[Ref. 4: p. 4-3(u)] 
Naval aviation planning has centered around large 
aircraft carriers since the end of the 1940's. The Navy's 
budget and its justification for shipbuilding, with the one 
exception of the submarine force, have centered around the 
large carrier. 
have influenced the stated justification for carriers which 
has emphasized variously the symbolic use in peacetime, use 
in limited war, and use in general war roles of the aircraft 
carrier. The emphasis may change, but the concept is essen- 
tially the same: 
nuclear propulsion and defended by escort ships and aircraft 
[Ref. 5: p. 211. Because of the combination of flexibility, 
offensive power, defensive capability and mobility, carriers 
Ever changing world conditions and technology 
A large aircraft carrier, preferably with 
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have continued to be the keystone of United States Naval 
strength and a major instrument of foreign policy since World 
War I1 [Ref. 6: p. 241 .  Critics often cite the "problem of 
vulnerability" as a key issue in arguing against the building 
of aircraft carriers. However, carriers have demonstrated 
that they can withstand numerous non-nuclear attacks and 
still retain an adequate level of operational capability to 
carry out their mission. As an example, in World War 11, the 
Japanese launched 2 , 3 1 4  aircraft in Kamikaze attacks against 
the U.S. fleet, singling out carriers as the main target. 
For all practical purposes, the Kamikaze was a guided missile 
(utilizing the most sophisticated guidance system possible-- 
a human being) yet not one U.S .  carrier was sunk in these 
attacks. The ability of the World War I1 carrier to turn 
back the Kamikazes was the result not only of the defenses 
the carriers put up, but also the toughness of the skips 
themselves. [Ref. 6: p. 2 2 1  
The heavily armored CVN of today is much more 
survivable in combat than its World War I1 predecessors. Its 
high speed makes it a more difficult target to find and to 
hit, and its heavy armor and high degree of compartrnenta- 
tion ensure that, if it is hit (by anything less than a 
nuclear weapon) it probably would not even have to cease 
regular operations [Ref. 7 :  p. 2 5 1 .  According to former 
Secretary of the Navy, J. William Middendorf, 11, and Admiral 
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Thomas H. Moorer (Chief of Naval Operations 1 9 6 7 - 7 0  and 
Chairman o f  the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 9 7 0 - 7 4 ) :  
"The myth of 'carrier vulnerability', is just that: A 
myth. A heavily armored high-speed ship at sea presents 
a rapidly moving, and maneuvering, target extremely diffi- 
cult to find, much less to hit and to hurt. It is infi- 
nitely easier to target and destroy our fixed-site shore 
based ammunition dumps, fuel depots, and air fields." 
[Ref. 7 :  p .  2 5 1  
The punishment that a modern nuclear carrier can take was 
demonstrated in an unfortunate incident in 1 9 6 9  when nine 
500-pound bombs (equivalent to six Soviet cruise missiles) 
exploded on the flight deck of the U.S.S.  Enterprise. "Despite 
the damage done, the Enterprise could have resumed flight 
operations within a matter of hours.'t [Ref. 7 :  p. 2 5 1  The 
NIMITZ CVNS, with a higher degree of compartmentation, 
better sprinkling systems, and generally improved fire-fighting 
and damage control procedures 
survivable. [Ref. 7 :  p. 2 5 1  
are even tougher and more 
The odds are much higher the United States will 
be involved in non-nuclear conflicts than in an atomic war 
(it seems safe to say a nuclear war would be the first and 
last such conflict) and the carrier's record of invulnerability 
in conventional wars is unmatched. A U.S. carrier has not 
been damaged by enemy action since World War 11. 
contrast: In the Korean War, all friendly tactical air fields 
were captured by enemy forces at least once [Ref. 6 :  p. 2 2 1 .  
In Vietnam, over 400 allied aircraft were lost from ground 
attack, and an additional 4,000 aircraft were damaged. In 
By way of 
1 7  
contrast, during the entire Vietnam War not one sea based 
aircraft was lost or damaged on board any U.S. carrier as a 
result of enemy action [Ref. 7 :  p. 2 3 1 .  
According to Warwick writing for "Flight Inter- 
national", aircraft carriers fulfill both nationalistic and 
international roles. It is the international impact of the 
carrier which most appeals to the Soviet Union and United 
States. The supercarrier with its attack aircraft can be 
an effective weapon of peace all over the world. Warwick 
states: 
written in the self-contained air force floating on its 
doorstep." [Ref. 8 :  p. 8 5 1  
"Any sane nation should be able to read the message 
"Calling out the carriers" is nothing new. Former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in a speech at the Naval 
War College said, "In the crises in which I was involved, the 
use of naval power, particularly the carrier, turned out to 
be almost invariably the crucial element." [Ref. 7 :  p. 231 
The flexibility of the aircraft carrier is recog- 
nized by the Soviet Union. U.S. Intelligence reports that 
the Soviets are building at least one Forrestal sized ( 7 8 , 0 0 0  
tons) nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be equipped with 
conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft. The Soviet 
Navy already operates two 40,000 ton V/STOL carriers--KIEV 
and MINSK--and has at least two more under construction. 
[Ref. 8 :  p. 861 
18 
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The U.S. Navy considers 12 deployable large deck 
carriers as minimally adequate [Ref. 4: p. 4-4(u)]. At this 
time, the Navy has 13 carriers (CVs/CVNs), one of which is 
undergoing a two-year-plus service life extension program 
(SLEP) modernization. As soon as the first SLEP carrier, 
Saratoga (CV-60), leaves the yard, another will enter for 
SLEP, thus keeping 1 2  deployable carriers, of which 4 would 
normally be deployed and the others would be involved in train- 
ing, transit, or overhaul [Ref. 9: p. 1091. 
Two more NIMITZ class nuclear carriers are now 
under construction. VINSON (CVN-70) should be delivered in 
1982. At that time, current planning calls for CORAL SEA 
(CV-43), completed in 1947, to become a training ship (AVT-16). 
When the recently authorized CVN-71 is completed about 1987, 
CORAL SEA would be decommissioned and the then 42-year o l d  MIDWAY 
(CV-41) would be relegated to the AVT role. [Ref. 9: p .  1091 
This program of combined new construction and 
extension of the service life of existing carriers will pro- 
vide 12 deployable large-deck carriers through the 1990s 
[Ref. 4: p .  4-4(u)]. During testimony before the House Armed 
Services Committee on March 11, 1981, the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward stated: 
"With the new attitude about really facing up to what we 
need, we are talking about a 15 battle group Navy as what 
is required to get back to that point where the risk is 
such that one can be more comfortable that [we are] buy- 
ing enough naval insurance." [Ref. 10: p .  471 
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Obvious ly ,  c a r r i e r s  w i l l  be  a round f o r  many y e a r s  
t o  come. With t h e  p l anned  major  m o d e r n i z a t i o n  o f  o u r  e x i s t -  
i n g  c a r r i e r s  g i v i n g  them 1 5  more y e a r s  o f  u s e f u l  l i f e ,  t h e  
F o r r e s t a l  c l a s s  w i l l  be  i n  t h e  f l e e t  a t  t h e  t u r n  o f  t h e  cen -  
t u r y .  The p l anned  CVN-71 w i l l  n o t  have  r e a c h e d  i t s  m i d - l i f e  
- 
p o i n t  i n  t h e  y e a r  2000. [Ref. 6 :  p .  261 
Admiral  James L .  Holloway I11 (Ch ie f  o f  Naval 
O p e r a t i o n s  1974-1978) s t a t e s :  
"Critics s a y  t h e  day  o f  t h e  c a r r i e r  i s  p a s t ,  and t h e y  
p o i n t  o u t  t h e  b a t t l e s h i p  came and went i n  50 y e a r s - -  
t h e r e f o r e ,  s o  w i l l  t h e  c a r r i e r .  Tha t  argument h a s  no 
f o u n d a t i o n .  S h i p s  d o n ' t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  and i n e v i t a b l y  
phase  o u t  by t y p e  i n  h a l f  a c e n t u r y . "  [Ref .  6 :  p .  261 
Holloway f u r t h e r  s t a t e s :  
"The c a r r i e r ' s  f u t u r e  i s  i n e x t r i c a b l y  t i e d  t o  t h e  manned 
a i r c r a f t  i t  f l i e s .  When p i l o t e d  a i r c r a f t  become o b s o l e t e ,  
s o  w i l l  c a r r i e r s .  I f  and when c a r r i e r s  do become more 
v u l n e r a b l e  t o  c o n v e n t i o n a l  weapons,  so  w i l l  a i r f i e l d s - -  
o n l y  more s o - - b u t  as long  a s  p i l o t e d  a i r c r a f t  a r e  s t i l l  
needed ,  t h e  Un i t ed  S t a t e s  w i l l  commit t h e  r e s o u r c e s  
n e c e s s a r y  t o  de fend  t h o s e  c a r r i e r s  and a i r f i e l d s . "  [Ref .  6 :  
P *  261 
b .  CW's and V/STOL 
I n  t h e  s p r i n g  o f  1979,  t h e  r e c e n t l y  r e t i r e d  
Deputy Chief  o f  Naval O p e r a t i o n s  (DCNO) f o r  A i r  War fa re ,  
Vice  Admiral  F r e d e r i c k  C .  T u r n e r ,  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  much d i s -  
c u s s e d  a i r c r a f t  c a r r i e r  c o n c e p t  c a l l e d  t h e  CW s t a t e d ,  " I t ' s  
n o t  a NIMITZ o r  a KENNEDY.  B u t ,  w i t h i n  c o s t  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  i t  
i s  a v e r y  good s h i p . "  [Ref .  11: p .  8 1  
I n  1972 a f e a s i b i l i t y  s t u d y '  f o r  a c o s t - c o n s t r a i n e d  
c a r r i e r  was u n d e r t a k e n .  A c o n c e p t u a l  d e s i g n  was r e a d y  f o r  
2 0  
review within two years. The design presented a minimum- 
cost carrier of sufficient size to operate modern fleet air- 
craft and capable of replacing MIDWAY-class CVs. The study 
was completed coincidental with a statement of intent by 
Congress that henceforth all major combatant ships would be 
nuclear-powered. This resulted in a rapid loss of interest 
in a medium-sized, conventionally-powered ship. Selection 
of a repeat of the NIMITZ design was chosen as the best 
alternative. [Ref. 11: p .  81 
A surprise move by President Ford in 1976 deleted 
the "repeatflNIMITZ (CVN-71) from the Navy's shipbuilding plan 
and substituted two ships called CWs. No one was exactly 
sure just what C W  meant. The general concept was that the 
C W  would be medium in size, conventionally powered and de- 
signed to operate vertical short take-off and landing (VSTOL) 
aircraft; hence the second "V" in the title stood for VSTOL. 
However, VSTOL technology had not progressed to a point where 
an all-VSTOL air wing was possible by the time this ship 
would be ready (1987), so the 1972 study for a minimum-cost 
carrier was dusted off to become the basis for the CVV. 
[Ref. 11: p .  81 
Continuing debate centered around the question 
of whether nuclear-powered or oil-powered carriers would be 
built. President Carter vetoed the congressionally-favored 
CVN nuclear carrier in 1978, promising a conventionally- 
powered carrier in FY 1980. The Chief of Naval Operations 
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(CNO) sought a more capable conventionally-powered alterna- 
tive to the C W ,  and after the President's veto, directed a 
I 
I * *  
study to determine the feasibility of building a follow-on 
to USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67). The study favorably endorsed 
this course of action and a recommendation was made to the 
President that a"repeat!'KENNEDY replace the C W  in the budget. 
The C W ,  however, remained as the administration's favored 
ship. [Ref. 11: pp. 8-91 
The Secretary of Defense stated at this time that 
the CV and CVN are more capable but cost $5 to $6 billion 
more over their life cycle when the cost of the greater quan- 
tity of aircraft these carriers could carry is considered. 
In the President's view, therefore, the C W  was considered 
as affordable and sufficient to meet the Navy's needs while 
the dollars saved could be spent on other naval programs. 
[Ref. 11: p .  91 
Smaller, non-nuclear carriers would have less 
financial impact on a given year's budget, could be construct- 
ed in almost any shipyard and would be easier to man. A 
number of "small" carrier designs have been put forward, from 
the sea control ship (SCS) of some 14,000 tons to the CVV of 
about 55,000 tons. [Ref. 9: p. 1101 
According to the fiscal year 1981 authorization 
conference report, the Navy has been investigating various 
sea-based aircraft platform alternatives for over three years. 
This study effort has not produced a forthcoming program to 
t 
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increase naval air capability at sea. Challenging technolog- 
ical changes in warfare can best be met by air-at-sea. 
cording to N. Polmar, writing in "United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings", failure to provide air capable platforms in this 
era of increasing naval capability would indeed be shortsighted. 
[Ref. 9: p. 1 1 0 1  
Ac- 
If the Navy continues to marshal all of its of- 
fensive firepower into twelve carriers the time will come in 
the mid-80s when the Soviets can have strong forces where we 
too are strong, and strong forces where we are weak, by dis- 
patching surface action or VSTOL groups. [Ref. 1: p. 7 4 1  
Although the approved plan is for at least 1 3  
large-deck carriers into the 21st century, it seems increas- 
ingly possible to multiply the number of our primary aircraft- 
carrying platforms at sea, our carriers, by building signif- 
icantly smaller and more numerous ones. This is, of course, 
contingent upon the further development of advaniced powered- 
lift aircraft. Despite the fanfare surrounding V/STOL, the 
development of sufficiently capable powered-lift aircraft is 
still far into the future. However, the possibility of 
tripling our carrier force should not be taken lightly. 
[Ref. 12: p. 1 4 7 1  
Building a completely new V/STOL ship before we 
have a fully operational plane should be studied in the light 
of history. The "drone antisubmarine helicopter" (DASH) pro- 
gram was an early 1960s  Navy program. Some 120-odd destroyers 
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were converted to take the DASH before the concept was fully 
tested. The after section of the destroyer was converted 
t o  a flight deck complete with a small hangar. 
never worked, and most of the hangars wound up being used 
for storage. The point is that ships were changed before 
the concept was fully developed, and the concept never worked. 
[Ref. 1 3 :  pp. 2 8 - 2 9 ]  
The program 
There will most likely be a new look in carriers 
in the future--but not until the vertical/short takeoff and 
landing (V/STOL) aircraft has matured. V/STOL cannot yet 
compete with conventional aircraft in speed, altitude, range, 
and payload. 
attack aircraft until it does become competitive in all those 
areas. Until V/STOL can match conventional aircraft in mis- 
sion capability, a total commitment to the vertical risers 
cannot be made, and construction of pure V/STOL carriers would 
not be prudent. [Ref. 6 :  p. 2 6 1  
It will not become the Navy's first line fighter- 
In the view of J. L. George, writing for - U.S.  
Naval Institute Proceedings, the West must proceed with cur- 
rent V/STOL programs and research and development for the 
long run. To do otherwise could have disastrous conclusions. 
It will be difficult t o  develop V/STOL aircraft that are 
interchangeable with CTOL aircraft. The Marine Corps is con- 
sidering V/STOL for ground support (AV-8B), but V/STOL aircraft 
as replacements for an F - 1 4  fighter or the S - 3  antisubmarine 
plane will be well into the future. [Ref. 13: pp. 2 4 - 2 8 ]  
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V/STOL aircraft are the only hope of providing substantial 
tactical air capability in smaller hulls, and we must develop 
a supersonic V/STOL fighter as a matter of national priority. 
In the same light, V/STOL platforms capable of bridging the 
offensive gap between large-deck carriers and major surface 
combatants must be developed. In order to optimize individual 
ship capability these ships should be a new design and not 
just smaller versions of the large-deck carrier. [Ref. 14: 
P .  501 
c. Air Capable Navy 
Perspective: Recognizing the advantages of sea- 
based, manned, tactical aircraft in recent years, the Navy 
has maintained an effort to develop high-performance aircraft 
which could operate from warships other than aircraft carriers 
in order to apply the advantages of sea-based air (SBA) across 
a wide range of ships. Aircraft operating from various types 
of surface combatants enhance the individual mission effective- 
ness of these ships. [Ref. 2 :  p .  2 0 1  
The operational interrelationships between aircraft 
(whether Conventional Take-off and Landing (CTOL), Vertical/ 
Short Take-off and Landing (V/STOL), Short Take-off and Land- 
ing (STOL) or Short Take-off Vertical Landing (STOVL), and the 
ships from which they operate could take four different forms. 
The aircraft could be based on a few relatively large ships 
and the fleet could have a tighter formation. In this situa- 
tion, neither the aircraft nor the ships are dispersed. As 
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an alternative, the ships could be dispersed with the air- 
craft concentrated on a small number of platforms. These 
operational relationships between aircraft and surface ships 
are not exclusive operational characteristics of CTOL aircraft 
operations, but are also viable options for STOL, STOVL and 
V/STOL aircraft. Two remaining options would be to have air- 
craft broadly dispersed on numerous ships with the ships in 
concentrated formation or to have the ships themselves dis- 
persed. The vertical landing capability of V/STOL and STOVL 
would provide greater basing flexibility associated with the 
last two options. [Ref. 1 5 :  p. 51 
The limited deck space on surface combatants other 
than aircraft carriers, make V/STOL aircraft, including heli- 
copters, very attractive to the Navy. Of all the technological 
factors which are influencing the character and form of the 
Navy of the future, perhaps none is as all-encompassing as 
the concept of the "air-capable Navy". The "air capable Navy" 
is commonly considered a navy utilizing tactical aircraft 
aboard a large number of small ships. [Ref. 1 6 :  p. 9 3 1  
Aircraft vastly extend the combat horizon of the 
surface ship and they can carry offensive weapons to ranges 
unattainable by other means. Additionally, they extend the 
perimeter defense against all threats. [Ref. 16: p. 9 4 1  
At the close of World War 11, the U.S. Navy pos- 
sessed more than 100 carriers o f  varying classes. With its 
present number of 1 3  carriers, the Navy's ability to cover 
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many areas simultaneously is limited. According to Captain 
G. G. O'Rourke, writing for "U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings", 
the strongest reason for future development of the U.S. Navy 
into an air-capable one is to ensure naval superiority over 
large areas for extended periods. 
provide a means to accomplish this task. [Ref. 16: p. 941 
Captain O'Rourke states: 
The air-capable Navy would 
"The additional aircraft at sea pay off in many ways. Sur- 
veillance coverage can be improved, even with V/STOL air- 
craft of significantly poorer overall performance than 
conventional carrier (CTOL) types. Their bases can be 
moved to compensate for shorter ranges, and their flexi- 
bility o f  take-off and landing times is not tied to a 
carrier's cycle. To have more aircraft aboard more ships 
makes possible shorter reaction time, permitting the quick 
deployment of force to a scene of action." [Ref. 16: p. 941 
The LAMPS (light airborne multi-purpose system) 
MK I11 is at the forefront in integrating the endurance of the 
surface ship with the versatility of the aircraft. LANPS will 
allow the small surface escort to operate as a more indepen- 
dent unit with greatly expanded tactical capabilities. It 
is envisioned that LAMPS I11 will pave the way for V/STOL to 
do the same. [Ref. 17: p. 1171 More than 2 0 0  LAMPS I11 
helicopters are in the U.S. Navy's current procurement plan 
[Ref. 10: p .  51. 
The air-capable Navy concept is not without po- 
tential shortcomings. The most immediate problem is the 
development of a suitable, practical, and financially feasible 
V/STOL aircraft. The success the RAF and U.S. Marines have 
had with the Harrier notwithstanding, the development of 
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V/STOL remains in its infancy. On board sensors, computers, 
and displays which make up an effective aircraft weapons 
system are weak when compared with those aboard CTOL aircraft. 
In order to minimize weight, their engines are "overblown" 
and reliability is reduced. Problems such as these will re- 
quire solutions before an air-capable Navy can become reality. 
[Ref. 16: p. 9 7 1  
New V/STOL designs may initially begin their ser- 
vice aboard large carriers. This would provide a focus of 
operational expertise, logistics/maintenance know-how, and 
increased environmental safety. Later, it would be possible 
to stage V/STOL aircraft from carriers to smaller ships [Ref. 
16: p. 1031. 
Possibly in the near future, with the reactivation 
of the battleship NEW JERSEY and the current D o D  plan calling 
for reactivation of the remaining three IOWA class battle- 
ships over the next three years [Ref. 10: p. 281, the Navy 
may modernize the after section o f  these ships to facilitate 
air operations with either helicopters or AV-8's. [Ref. 18: 
P .  5 4 1  
Supporting naval aircraft in small numbers on 
various types of ships is a matter of policy, and the Navy 
is continuing t o  investigate the possibility of all surface 
combatants with an air capability. [Ref. 15: p. 11 
In an effort to assess the feasibility of V/STOL 
aircraft, the Navy conducted exploratory studies in 1975 and 
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1976 into the feasibility of V/STOL, to determine whether or 
not a fully mission-capable V/STOL aircraft could be developed. 
If this were possible, it was a l s o  necessary to determine if 
these aircraft would be at least as operationally effective 
as the CTOL aircraft they would replace. [Ref. 4: pp. 3-81 
It was decided in August 1977 to transition Sea 
Based Air (SBA) to V/STOL aircraft provided that the V/STOL 
concept was validated. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admir- 
al James L. Holloway, issued the V/STOL concept source docu- 
ment which provided the basic guidance to plan f o r  transition 
to an all-V/STOL force, along with the conceptual plan for 
V/STOL aircraft development and fleet introduction. This 
transition was to occur at the end of the normal service life 
of the Navy's present aircraft inventory. The primary objec- 
tive was to maintain the current capability of the Navy's 
SBA throughout the transition. Initial V/STOL aircraft 
(V/STOL A) were to be phased into the fleet in the early 199Os, 
followed by high performance V/STOL B aircraft in the mid-to- 
late 1990s.  [Ref. 4 :  pp. 3-81 
Budget austerity and the Congressional Authoriza- 
tion Conference Report associated with the FY 80 budget delayed 
the timetable. The report stated it was too early to make a 
commitment t o  any type of V/STOL and tasked the Navy with 
continuing its investigation of advanced aircraft technology. 
[Ref. 4: pp. 3-81 
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In his report to the House Armed Services Committee 
on the Fiscal Year (FY) 8 3  Budget of the Navy, the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, stated: 
"You will find a V/STOL program once again, as we seek to 
examine new options for providing TACAIR at sea later in 
this decade. In all candor, I am most dissapointed with 
the constraining action of Congress over the past five 
years, which has seriously inhibited our ability to delve 
into the potential offered by vertical lift aircraft. On 
the one hand the Navy is criticized for not having suffi- 
cient vision to realize the potential of distributing its 
TACAIR (Tactical Air) assets on platforms other than car- 
riers. 
impossible to proceed with any alacrity in search of such 
potential." [Ref. 10: pp. 2 7 - 2 8 ]  
Yet, on the other hand, the Congress has made it 
Admiral Hayward went on t o  state: 
"The major reduction in our FY 82 request for V/STOL tech- 
nology illustrates the point. I urge your full support 
for our FY 8 3  V/STOL program which will permit us to pro- 
ceed logically with the medium-speed range lift fan for 
such missions as ASW, AEW, tanker and carrier on board 
delivery (COD). For missions requiring higher speeds, we 
seek to investigate augmented deflected engine nozzle 
technology (ADEN) using an A-6  airframe." [Ref. 10: pp. 
2 7 - 2 8 ]  
Obviously, Admiral Hayward is committed to the further devel- 
opment of alternative approaches to the employment of TACAIR 
at sea. 
3 .  Aircraft 
The time worn motto "find, fix and strike" is as valid 
today as it ever was. However, the means have changed and 
are continually developing. The aircraft still has a vital 
role to play in finding surface ships, submarines and other 
aircraft. Satellites and missiles with "smart" heads may well 
eclipse the aircraft in the future b u t ,  neither the satellite 
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nor the missile has the flexibility provided by the piloted 
aircraft. The F-14 Tomcat has been cited as an exceptional 
weapon system and the F/A-18 incorporates the latest advanced 
technology. 
strike aircraft, will soon join the fleet. [Ref. 19: p. 261 
The F/A-18, the Navy's first combined fighter- 
The Armed Forces of the United States face an era 
where both the military threat and technological environment 
are changing rapidly. While recognizing the need for future 
planning and preparation for the day when the "big-decks" 
will be retired, the Navy must face a more immediate problem 
of replacing aging F-4s and A-7s. 
the necessary interim solution. [Ref. 20: p. 3891 
The F/A-18 appears to be 
The battle group, centered around the large-deck 
carrier (60,000-90,000 ton displacement), represents the of- 
fensive striking power of the U.S. Navy. Despite the speed, 
toughness, and survi-rability of the "big-decks", Commander 
R. C. Powers, writing for "Military Engineer", considers sur- 
vivability an issue. The rapid and sustained growth in capa- 
bility of Soviet maritime forces, particularly in the areas 
of antiship missiles and nuclear submarines (coupled with the 
fact that Soviet doctrine calls for tactical use of nuclear 
weapons under certain conditions), has caused increased con- 
cern for the survivability of the limited number o f  U.S. 
large-deck carriers. [Ref. 2 0 :  p .  3901 
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If the U.S. continues to build large carriers, the 
force levels would continue to decline (due to single unit 
procurement costs) and vulnerability would tend to increase. 
An alternative would be to procure a larger number of smaller 
V/STOL carriers which would increase survivability signifi- 
cantly through dispersal. According to Powers, this is a 
great idea except for the fact that there is an absence of 
high-performance, air superiority V/STOL aircraft that can 
meet the projected Soviet threat. [Ref. 20: p. 3901 
"V/STOL aircraft development evokes comparison with a TV 
soap opera: An abundance of activity, substantial sound, 
and, on occasion, more than a little fury, but no matter 
how infrequently revisited, always a certain sameness 
about the plot--projections no closer to reality, tech- 
nology no closer to closing the gap with conventional 
aircraft, and mission requirements no closer to defining 
a role that makes V/STOL clearly worth the cost." [Ref. 
21: p. 2 4 1  
It would be unfair to say that no progress has been 
made in the twenty-five-odd year gestation period of V/STOL. 
Exploratory development efforts have produced the following 
approaches to V/STOL: 
a. The AV-8A Harrier is a small aircraft, weighing 
11,890 lb. It has a maximum take-off gross weight of 24,600 
l b .  with a 1500-ft. ground roll making its gross-to-empty- 
weight ratio roughly comparable with other light attack air- 
craft. It can take off and land vertically at a lower gross 
weight of 17,050 lb. 
lb. payload, divided between ordnance and fuel, is a miniscule 
Operating in the VTOL mode the 5,000 
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amount by conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft 
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standards. [Ref. 21: p. 2 5 1  
b. The AV-8B (the follow-on to the AV-8A) has com- 
pleted testing at Naval Air Test Center Patuxent River, Mary- 
land. New technology along with fuselage, nozzle, and flap 
modifications have boasted the vertical take-off weight to 
nearly 20,000 l b .  at a cost of only 580 lb. more in empty 
weight. The AV-8B is the state-of-the-art in V/STOL aircraft. 
Only about 3 percent of its empty weight is directly connected 
with the vertical flight provision. 
mode it compares well with operational CTOL attack aircraft 
in the same weight class. [Ref. 21: p. 251 
In the short take-off 
c. The XV-15 TILT ROTOR bridges the capabilities 
gap between V/STOLs and CTOLs. 
helicopter-like rotors mounted on tilting nacelles at each 
wing tip. 
mode and vertical lift in the helicopter mode. The Navy 
joined the tilt rotor program in 1 9 7 9  when studies showed 
tilt rotors could be applicable to Anti-submarine Warfare 
(ASW), Marine Corps assault support, Air Early Warning (AEW), 
and search and rescue missions. [Ref. 2 2 :  p. 231  
This is done by using large 
These rotors provide forward thrust in the airplane 
. 
d. The XFV-12A is a thrust-augmented-wing design 
originated in 1 9 7 3  when Rockwell and the U.S. Navy considered 
the potential performance improvement obtainable from STOL 
vice VTOL operations. 
sufficiently new technological information will likely result 
in cancellation of this program. [Ref. 2 3 :  p. 7 1 1  
A shortage of funding and the lack of 
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e. The ( 'X" WING is a new VTOL aircraft being devel- 
oped for the U.S. Navy. 
helicopter mode,but unlike a normal helicopter, at speeds of  
about 200  knots, the rotor is stopped and locked into place. 
The blades then function as conventional wings for flight up 
to high subsonic speeds. 
the X - W I N G  technology is being built by Lockheed for test and 
evaluation and should be flying soon. [Ref. 2 4 :  p. 1151  
It has a four-bladed rotor for the 
A single-seat aircraft incorporating 
Aircraft for land and maritime air superiority have 
proven essential and CTOL aircraft are the only means of pro- 
viding the required igh performance today. A high perfor- 
mance V/STOL aircraft is technologically possible; however, 
it will not be here tomorrow--it will take long term develop- 
ment. 
force survivability and flexibility in a number o f  ways and 
they are here today. Current air superiority aircraft will 
remain in the force until high-performance V/STOL aircraft 
are available. [Ref. 2 0 :  p. 3991 
Mid-range performance V/STOL aircraft can increase 
The decision to adopt new V/STOL concepts can proba- 
bly be postponed f o r  a number of years without damaging force 
credibility. However, V/STOL aircraft seem inevitable, and 
there are important steps that can be taken in the near term. 
[Ref. 2 0 :  p .  3901  Not unreasonably, it is still deemed more 
essential that the Navy acquire the aircraft it needs to keep 
its carriers the viable force they must remain through the 
end of the century. Nonetheless, as important as these present 
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problems are, history has provided sufficient evidence of 
the folly of mortgaging the future to pay for the present. 
[Ref. 21: p. 301 
4. Technology 
Doctor William J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Engineering, in testimony before the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on December 4, 1980, stated: 
?'I believe the technology that we are incorporating today 
will improve reliability, make the equipments easier to 
maintain and easier to o erate relative to equipments that 
are now in the field." P Ref. 25: p. 101 
Doctor Perry further stated: 
"...it is important to note that modern technology--especially 
microelectronics--not only allows us to achieve superior 
performance, but also allows us to reduce cost, maintenance 
and operating problems, and to increase reliability. These 
advantages are only now beginning to be felt in the field 
because systems incorporating microelectronics technology 
have only been in production in military systems for a few 
years." [Ref. 25: p. 4 6 1  
a. Aircraft 
The latest in Naval aircraft technology is rep- 
resented by the F/A-18 Hornet currently in transition in 
VFA-125, and the AV-8B Harrier which will soon be introduced 
into the Marine Corps. [Ref. 4 :  pp. 1-22] 
The multi-mission F/A-18 is designed to bring 
forth a quantum improvement in aircraft reliability and main- 
tainability. 
Receiver (FLIR) system, a laser spot tracker, and a high 
resolution ground map radar. [Ref. 4: pp. 1-22] 
The Hornet includes a Forward-looking Infrared 
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The cockpit layout of the F/A-18 is unique in that 
a Heads-up Display (HUD) of advanced design is used. 
Front Console (UFC) is located directly below the HUD and 
controls all Communications, Navigation, and Identification 
functions. Three cathode ray tube (CRT) displays take up most 
of the main instrument panel. [Ref. 2 6 :  p. 2 7 1  
An Up 
The flight control system is a quadruple redundant 
fly-by-wire system, with a mechanical backup to the aircrafts 
stabilators. 
computers, which allow fine tuning of  the flying qualities 
of the aircraft. [Ref. 2 6 :  p. 311 
The system is controlled by two flight control 
The F/A-18 is powered by two General Electric 
F-404-GE-400 low bypass turbofan engines in the 16,000-pound 
thrust class. 
the size of the F-4 Phantom’s GE 5 - 7 9  engines, yet it is in 
the same thrust class. 
F-404 engine contains 7 , 7 0 0  fewer parts than the GE 5 - 7 9 ,  
[Ref. 2 7 :  p. 1 2 1  
The F-404 power plant is approximately one-half 
Employing the modular philosophy, the 
The engines of the F/A-18 are not removed from 
the aircraft f o r  inspections. 
borescoping the installed engines and monitoring engine con- 
dition data recorded on a tape in the aircraft. 
sories and most components are easily replaced through the 
engine bay doors. The engines are designed to be replaced 
in 20 minutes. [Ref. 2 6 :  pp. 2 7 - 2 9 ]  
Inspections are performed by 
All acces- 
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The aircraft is equipped with two mission computers 
located in the avionics compartment along with the flight 
control computers. 
are single deep for quick access. The F / A - 1 8  is designed s o  
that modular plug-out, plug-in technology will provide quick 
repairs without the use of work stands. 
Most weapon replaceable assemblies (WRAs) 
[Ref. 2 7 :  p. 1 2 1  
Built-In-Test (BIT) is incorporated in most of 
the avionics systems, and the hydroelectromechanical systems 
incorporate Non-Avionics-Buil t - In-Test  (NABIT). Faults are 
indicated as a code on the maintenance monitor panel ( M p )  in 
the nose wheelwell. 
b. Structures 
Combat aircraft currently in service are built 
almost entirely of aluminum alloy, with some other metals such 
as titanium and steel. Increasing demand for improved per- 
formance has accelerated development of a new generation of 
composite materials. [Ref. 2 8 :  p. 3 3 1  
Composites have been in use for well over a decade. 
In 1968 Grumman aircraft was the first company to build pro- 
duction examples of a primary load-bearing structure (one on 
which the aircraft depends for safe flight) using composite 
material. 
for the F - 1 4 ,  using boron-epoxy skins covering an aluminum- 
honeycomb core. 
than the titanium component it replaced and the new tailplane 
entered routine service in 1 9 7 0 .  
This was the horizontal stabilizer (the tailplane) 
The structure proved to be 19 percent lighter 
In 1971, Grumman developed 
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a boron/carbon/glass-fibre/epoxy hybrid which is utilized in 
the fairings on top of the swing wings of the F - 1 4 ;  these are 
26 percent lighter and only 6 0  percent of the cost of their 
metal counterparts. [Ref. 28: pp. 33-35] 
More recently, the AV-8B7 which will be delivered 
to the U.S. Marine Corps in 1983, has been design modified 
to use composite materials, and the wing is made entirely of 
graphite composite material, including its inner structure. 
This is perhaps the most outstanding application of composites 
to date. [Ref. 29: p. 211 
McDonnell Douglas, contractor for the AV-8B, has 
also been investigating an alternative method of joining metal 
sections under the U.S. Air Force's adhesive bonding program-- 
Primarily Adhesively Bonded Structure Technology (PABST). 
Adhesive bonding, in which pieces are "glued" together with 
resin rather than riveted, provides a lighter structure that 
is highly durable and cheaper to build and maintain than con- 
ventional methods of construction. [Ref. 28:  p. 351 
Although there are prospects for further improve- 
ment in aluminum alloys and in titanium, the greatest scope 
for structural development would appear to be in the more 
widespread adoption of composite materials such as carbon- 
carbon. [Ref. 3 0 :  p p .  6 - 7 )  The use  of composites in aircraft 
structures offers substantial weight savings with associated 
increase i n  structural efficiency. [Ref. 31:  p .  1 0 1  
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Studies by the North American Aircraft Division 
of Rockwell International Corp. indicate that glass fibre/ 
composite materials would account for about 15 percent of a 
simplistic baseline bomber in 1990, but would increase to 
5 5  percent by the year 2000. In general, the aluminum content 
would decline in favor of composite materials, with the per- 
centage of other materials remaining approximately the same. 
[Ref. 32: p. 1431 
c. Engines 
Engine technology continues to develop particu- 
larly with respect to thrust-to-weight ratio and engine spe- 
cific fuel consumption. Engines are becoming smaller and 
lighter for a given level of thrust. An important aspect of 
engine development over the past decade, and one not normally 
noticed, is that engines are becoming relatively shorter. 
This has been the result of improved stage efficiency in com- 
pressors and turbines, resulting in fewer compressor or tur- 
bine discs; higher compression ratios also mean smaller 
combustion systems. [Ref. 33: p. 2911 
Increased thrust-to-weight ratio capability can 
provide increased supersonic maneuverability, smaller and 
less expensive aircraft as well as V/STOL capability, or some 
combination of all these features. [Ref. 34: p. 8 0 1  The 
cumulative effect is most noticeable in reducing the weight 
of the engines; however, the reduction in length can be par- 
ticularly important in relation to future vectored thrust 
V/STOL aircraft. [Ref. 33: p. 2911 
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Besides a higher thrust-to-weight ratio, the 
1 9 9 0 s  engine will probably feature rectangular exhaust nozzles 
with thrust-vectoring capability (Thrust vectoring or revers- 
ing involves deflecting engine exhaust gases to achieve better 
takeoff, landing, and maneuvering characteristics). [Ref. 
3 4 :  p. 811 The Rolls Royce Pegasus engine, currently utilized 
in the AV-8B, through its swivelling nozzles provides the 
ability to generate the 21,500 l b .  of thrust vertically or 
horizontally at an installed thrust-to-weight ratio of 6 to 
1. Thrust weight ratio for this engine is projected to in- 
crease further to 8 to 1. [Ref. 30: p. 5 1  Additionally, a 
Pegasus type of engine with thrust boosting matching super- 
sonic thrust requirements may be provided by burning fuel 
in the front nozzles. This principle, known as Plenum 
Chamber Burning (PCB) has been the subject of experimental 
programs in preparation for the possible launch of a super- 
sonic V/STOL aircraft in the mid to late-80s. [Ref. 30: p. S ]  
If this approach continues, the next generation 
of engines will reach a thrust-to-weight ratio of 10 to 1 
[Ref. 34: p .  801 .  The Rockwell studies anticipate that 
engine thrust-to-weight ratios would increase by about 40 
percent during the decade from 1990 to the year 2000 for 
engines in the same general size and weight category. 
3 2 :  p. 1431 
[Ref. 
In reaching a nearer term thrust-to-weight 
ratio of 10 to 1, the most significant contribution will come 
from increasing engine operating temperature. 
higher operating temperatures will provide higher performance. 
The effect of higher temperatures and heat load on turbine 
airfoil durability must be compensated for by a combination 
of improved materials, more efficient cooling schemes, or 
additional cooling air. Increased coolant levels, however, 
result in efficiency losses. Recent breakthroughs in cooling 
technologies and materials are just now allowing for simul- 
taneous increases in the temperature capability and cooling 
efficiency of advanced airfoils. This permits significant 
increases in turbine inlet temperature. The trend toward 
higher operating temperatures is ensured through introduction 
of new engine alloys. 
advances have been made in the sophistication of the internal 
cooling configurations that can be cast into the airfoils. 
[Ref. 3 4 :  pp. 81-82] 
Generally, 
In parallel with alloy developments, 
Another important contribution to improved engine 
reliability, as well as reduced cost and weight, is the de- 
velopment and application of advanced microprocessor tech- 
nology in engine controls. Where the engines of today are 
controlled by a combination of electronic and hydromechanical 
computers, advanced powerplants will use digital electronic 
controls. Eventually all hydromechanical components, with 
the possible exception of hydraulic pumps and actuators may 
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be replaced by electronics. Control systems of this type 
will be produced and maintained at a lower cost, incorporate 
comprehensive fault detection, provide substantial improve- 
ments in reliability and durability, and provide more accurate 
control of all engine variables. [Ref. 34: p. 831 
It is envisioned that the next generation engine 
will not achieve these performance improvements at the expense 
of acquisition cost, durability or reliability and that con- 
current improvements are predicted in each of these areas. 
[Ref. 34: p. 8 1 1  
d. Avionics 
During the past two decades, unforeseen technical 
developments in avionics have occurred. The favorable trend 
in equipment weight, volume and cooling requirements will 
obviously have a cumulative effect on aircraft size reduction 
as well as increased capability. There has been a steady 
improvement in new generation avionics equipment reliability 
and it is anticipated that there will be an even greater 
improvement in the next few years. [Ref. 33: p .  2891  
Where the commercial world is continuing to em- 
phasize greater density, the military sees a greater need for 
higher processing speeds. The Defense Department's answer to 
this is the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) pro- 
gram. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
on the subject of VHSIC (December 4, 1 9 8 0 ) ,  Dr. Perry stated: 
4 
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"A major thrust of our advanced technology program today-- 
the largest single advanced technology program we have--is 
the VHSIC program. It is intended to accelerate the intro- 
duction not only of large scale integrated (LSI) circuits 
into military equipment, but very large scale integrated 
(VLSI) circuits as well. For a given size chip, it will 
increase the number of functions, the number of bits on 
that chip by a factor of about 100 over present capabili- 
ties and it will at the same time increase the speed of 
operation." [Ref. 2 5 :  p. 1 4 1  
D o D  is investing $ 2 2 5  million in its VHSIC pro- 
gram over a six year period that began in 1979. [Ref. 3 5 :  p. 4 1  
The program is a broad, joint service program which is de- 
signed to benefit DoD systems of the future. Its goal is to 
push the integrated circuit technology of the DoD contractor 
base to a point well beyond the reach of Soviet System de- 
signers. The second area of concentration is to design chips 
and subsystems which maximize reliability, commonality, and 
performance and which minimize test, maintenance and other 
support requirements. 
The rationale for maximization of reliability is 
that increased maintenance and decreased reliability are not 
inherent in complexity and that integrated circuits have 
proven this. As the capability built into a given silicon 
chip has increased from one transistor to 100 thousand tran- 
sistors, the reliability of the chip has remained roughly 
constant. In the end, if a system can be built into a single 
chip, it can be extremely reliable. [Ref. 36: p. 5 2 1  
The concept of "Fly-by-wire" (the well-known phrase 
for the replacement of the rods and levers in the pilot's 
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controls by electric signals) is also dependent upon modern 
computing to take a considerable amount of the load off the 
pilot, making the aircraft easier and safer to fly. It can 
ensure the pilot does not inadvertently get into dangerous 
situations (for instance stall o r  spin avoidance). This is 
an advanced system and its increased use is assured. [Ref. 
37: p. 501  
Yet another area where future improvements are 
expected is in Built-in-Test (BIT) capability. In some air- 
craft applications today, the BIT features of avionics, 
stores management sets, and weapon release systems are more 
sophisticated than the system itself. The ability to auto- 
matically test and isolate faults is a difficult engineering 
task and it is anticipated that in the future BIT will be 
perfected further so that it provides a great deal more pre- 
cision, reliability and capability. [Ref. 38 :  p .  903 
During the next 1 5  years avionics (and electronics 
in general) will probably see a period of upgraded hardware 
technology and increased software complexity in computer 
technology. Additionally, voice-stimulated and controlled 
electronics, lasers operating as radars and landing guidance 
systems will be introduced. Real-time signal processing will 
be the heart of most systems. Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) 
can not handle most real-time problems today and the support 
of improved BIT concepts will be required to ensure testability. 
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Electronic components will have achieved several orders of 
* -  magnitude more complexity per integrated circuit. The sys- 
tem on a chip will be widespread, and single printed circuit 
boards may house all of the aircraft's electronics. sr [Ref. 
39:  pp. 6 - 3 3 ]  
The latter half of the 1 9 7 0 s  has seen military 
aircraft technology advance with fly-by-wire, digital avionics, 
carbon-fibre structures and digital flight controls. It is 
expected that through the remainder of the 1 9 8 0 s ,  1 9 9 0 s  and 





will continue. [Ref. 3 3 :  p. 2971 
5 .  Personnel 
LCDR R .  E. Gonzales, Jr., writing for "U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings" in 1979  posed the question: "...where 
are we going to get the people to train?" [Ref. 40: p .  371 
He further stated: 
"The signs are that our supply of young adults is becom- 
ing scarcer as well as less capable. The decline in 
College Board test scores which began about 1 9 6 3  is o n l y  
one indication that our educational systems are not 
turning out the bright-eyed workers of years past. To 
aggravate the problem of lower quality, the quantity is 
dwindling fast as well. Population trends indicate that 
the supply of young adults available for military service 
peaked about 1 9 7 5  and will decline 2 5 %  by 1990 . "  [Ref. 
40: p. 371 
VADM M. S. Holcomb, also writing for "U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings", in 1 9 8 0  stated: 
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"Having adequate numbers of qualified people is of at 
least equal importance to the Navy as are its inventories 
of ships and aircraft. But here, newer is not necessarily 
better. Older is better. 
Since 1 9 7 7 ,  we have met our recruiting goals fairly well, 
but we have failed to meet retention goals with respect 
to either first-term or second-term personnel. Nor have 
we retained the customary numbers of career people." [Ref. 
41: p .  4 5 1  
In contrast to the preceding statements, Admiral 
Hayward stated in his FY 83 Military Posture Statement before 
the House Armed Services Committee in 1982: 
"There is much good news to share with the Congress this 
year with respect to the military manpower situation in 
the Navy, in stark contrast to the alarm I registered 
with you during the 1 9 7 9  and 1 9 8 0  Congressional Hearings . . . .  
It is a pleasure indeed to be able to report to Congress 
that in the last 14 months, or s o ,  there has been a major 
turnaround in the attitude, morale, and retention of our 
experienced careerists . . . .  there is every reason to believe 
we can fully man the 600-ship Navy given sustained reten- 
tion performances like this." [Ref. 10: pp. 38-41) 
For the past few years, a number of articles presented 
a running commentary of Navy manpower and personnel problems. 
Recruiting shortfalls, record-high desertion rates, and de- 
clining levels of literacy among incoming recruits have become 
routine headlines in the press. According to Captain B. 
Harris, in his article "How Will W e  Man the Fleets?", the 
headlines fail to reveal that applicants for officer programs 
today bring the highest average test scores on record; 7 5  
percent of today's recruits test above the 50th percentile 
and more than 75  percent are high school graduates; the num- 
ber of people reenlisting for a second hitch is at record 




that the Navy is faced with some serious personnel problems 
but is aware o f  this fact, is dealing with the problems and 
stands ready to carry out any assigned mission. [Ref. 4 2 :  
P. 7 2 1  
Regardless of the present "turnaround" in retention 
of experienced careerists, there is a continuing concern 
over the Navy's inability to recruit, train, and retain ade- 
quate numbers of qualified men and women to operate and main- 
tain aviation systems in the 1 9 8 0 s  and beyond. The development, 
installation, and deployment of sophisticated combat systems 
within the U.S. Navy is a direct result of the sophistication 
of the threat facing U..S. Naval forces at sea. The increasing 
technical requirements for training the personnel to maintain 
these sophisticated systems has reduced the number of new 
entry personnel qualifying for training. At the same time 
this has placed a commercial premium on those personnel who 
have successfully completed training programs. The ever 
increasing demand for experienced, trained personnel together 
with changing national attitudes and the real or perceived 
decreasing military benefits, have adversely affected reten- 
tion of quality personnel in the Navy. [Ref. 4: p. 6-l(u)] 
The requirement for high quality recruits is driven 
by a need for large numbers of personnel capable of absorbing 
the training and able to operate and maintain exceptionally 
sophisticated equipment. The technical manuals for the World 
War I1 Navy fighters ran about 950 pages. A good mechanic 
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with a set of wrenches and a circuit tester could keep ahead 
* .  
of the problems. The technical manual for today's F - 1 4  has 
300,000 pages and requires special skills in electronics and 
data processing rather than basic electricity and mechanics. 
There are an increasing number of people who want to join the 
Navy today but could not begin t o  deal with such complexity 
and must be turned away. The truth is, there are not enough 
simple jobs to accommodate every motivated but marginally 
qualified applicant. [Ref. 4 2 :  p. 7 7 1  
Admiral Hayward summarized the Navy's personnel prob- 
lems in his latest Military Posture Statement when he stated: 
"The Navy remains some 22,000 Petty Officers s h o r t .  That 
shortage, while declining steadily over the next five 
years, will nevertheless remain significant, which means 
there will be little let-up in the extraordinary demands 
we place upon the individual sailor and marine. Without 
continued Congressional support, we cannot hope t o  e1imi'- 
nate the present deficit in trained, experienced manpower. 
With Congressional support, we can be completely confident 
o f u r  ability to do so--and o f  our ability to man the 
rowing Navy that is so vital t o  our Defense posture." f Ref. 10: p. 4 1 1  
6 .  Summary 
Whatever the Navy's mission during the next 20 years, 
it is apparent that sea based air will continue t o  play a 
significant role, with the large-deck carrier clearly remain- 
ing the prominent platform through the year 2000. As the 
century draws to a close, the possibility exists that the 
high cost of the large deck CV/CVNs may usher in smaller 
V/STOL equipped carriers as part of the force mix. Should 
further V/STOL development progress to a point allowing 
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greater dispersal of TACAIR, a mix of large-deck CTOL carriers 
and smaller CW's might be supplemented with V/STOL aircraft 
aboard smaller combatants in an "air-capable" Navy concept. 
Further breakthroughs in aircraft design could result in other 
combinations of force structure. 
The F/A-18, AV-8B, and LAMPS I11 aircraft are current- 
ly in the forefront of what may very well be a quantum leap 
in Naval aircraft technology through the year 2000. Included 
in a wide range of technological developments will be: greater 
use of composite aircraft structures; lighter, smaller, higher 
thrust engines; highly miniaturized VHSIC avionics systems; 
greater use of fly-by-wire systems and BIT capabilities. While 
technology continues to advance rapidly, future demographic 
trends may affect t h e  Navy's ability to attract sufficient 
numbers of high quality personnel. 
B. NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE FOR THE FUTURE: DISCUSSION 
1. Perspective 
In the 1940s ,  comparatively simple weapon systems 
were manufactured in large quantities. As time passed, com- 
plexity increased. As design margins decreased i n  the 5 0 s  
and 60s in order to obtain the last bit of performance out 
of the state-of-the-art, system effectiveness technology 
began to lag. [Ref. 4 3 :  p. 2 0 1  
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Assumption of responsibility for maintenance policy 
by the ASD (SGL) in 1959  gave recognition to the increasing 
cost of equipment maintenance. The Naval Aviation Maintenance 
Program, which provides an integrated system for performing 
aeronautical equipment maintenance and all related support 
functions, was established 26 May 1959 by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. [Ref. 44: p. i] 
It is generally accepted that when a new weapon sys- 
tem enters initial production, over 80 percent of future 
maintenance requirements are already locked in as a result of 
the design. In the early 1 9 6 0 s ,  equipment designed for mini- 
mum practical maintenance was perceived as yielding the largest 
single improvement on maintenance workloads and cost. DoD 
Directive 4 1 0 0 . 3 5 ,  "Integrated Logistics Support Planning,'' 
issued in June 1 9 6 4 ,  was a quantum leap toward reducing main- 
tenance demand by requiring detailed support plans for new 
systems [Ref. 45 :  pp. 5 - 6 1  
The Naval Air Systems Command initiated the Analytical 
Maintenance Program (AMP) in 1972 to improve its capability 
to define, justify, and execute the most efficient maintenance 
programs possible for sophisticated aircraft weapon systems. 
AMP was prompted by the realization that the cost of "main- 
tenance as usual" on new or planned aircraft was becoming 
prohibitive. The purpose of AMP, specifically, was to imple- 
ment the Reliability Centered Maintenance [RCM) philosophy 
(i.e., additional maintenance cannot improve the reliability 
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inherent in the design of hardware). 
generally favorable. 
tions of maintenance requirements and program decisions exists 
at all levels. [Ref. 46: pp. 16-18] 
The results to date are 
An increased awareness of cost implica- 
In the continuing effort to improve the management 
of equipment maintenance, to improve both technical and pro- 
duction performance while reducing costs, the risk that mana- 
gers will redouble their efforts but lose sight of the objective 
is always present. 
cost. 
equal weight with, but not overshadow, readiness. 
The objective is readiness at minimum 
The "minimum cost" part of the objective must hold 
[Ref. 45: 
P -  9 1  
Readiness of current U.S. forces and weapons, however, 
has been declining despite the large portion of the Defense 
Department budget allocated to Operations and Maintenance. 
The effective maintenance and operation of the current hard- 
ware inventory is a problem for the Department of Defense 
and questions as to whether we are fielding "leading-edge" 
technology which is beyond our capability and dollar resources 
to maintain are increasing. [Ref. 2 5 :  p. 21 These concerns 
are generally recognized; however, current maintenance tech- 
nology, training, and management systems have culminated in 
the best national defense maintenance capability to date. 
Even with improved capability, increased complexity of 
weapon systems have increased the maintenance burden. 
the other hand, technological innovations that have created 
On 
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today's maintenance capabilities must be followed by more if 
maintenance is to respond to changing readiness requirements. 
[Ref. 4 7 :  p .  I] 
2 .  Reliability and Maintainability 
Reliability and maintainability as goals in design 
and development will have a lot more clout in the 1980s  than 
they had in the past. The spectacular performance and capa- 
bility of a weapon system is meaningless if it is not flyable 
or launchable. The Defense Department's dissatisfaction with 
the high failure rates of systems resulted in a bill of par- 
ticulars being drawn up in 1976 by the principal deputy 
director o f  defense research and engineering. Efforts to 
improve reliability up to that time included tightening re- 
quirements, use of standard high reliability parts and incen- 
tive or penalty fees. None succeeded to any degree. [Ref. 
48: p. 131 It was emphasized that the key to designing for 
reliability and maintainability is front-end investment during 
engineering development. However, because the added cost is 
now, and the life-cycle cost saving is years down the road, 
front-end investment is a potential victim of the budget 
cutter. [Ref. 4 8 :  p. 1 3 1  
The Navy has been leading the fight to improve the 
reliability of its weapons systems, in part because the ship- 
borne environment exacts a higher price to support undependa- 
ble equipment. In the early 1 9 7 0 s ,  the Navy Material Command 
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hired reliability specialists from the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration's Saturn/Apollo lunar landing pro- 
gram in an effort to enhance the readiness of its fleet 
systems. A new reliability directorate, Deputy Chief of 
Naval Material for reliability, maintainability and quality 
assurance, was headed up by Willis J. Willoughby, Jr., former 
director of Apollo reliability, quality and safety. Willoughby 
has become the Navy's reliability authority, stressing depend- 
able performance through design from the beginning. 
F/A-18 and its General Electric F404 engines are the first 
examples to incorporate reliability engineering principles 
which have been applied essentially from the beginning. 
[Ref. 49: pp. 42-43] 
The 
Critics often say they have heard great and wondrous 
things about technology in years past. They heard it in the 
195Os, they heard it in the 1 9 6 0 s ,  they heard it in the early 
1970s  and they are hearing it again today about the 1 9 8 0 s .  
We always seem to have things on the drawing board that are 
going to make dramatic improvements in every direction. They 
just don't ever seem to make it to the field in large quanti- 
ties. Responding to this criticism, Doctor William J. Perry, 
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
December 4, 1980 stated: 
"Technology can be employed in many ways. 
t o  make weapon systems simply elegant. But it can also 
It can be used 
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be used to make weapons systems elegantly simple, and in 
so doing decreases the requirements on military manpower." 
[Ref. 25: p. 6 1  
Technology has been used to gain the performance edge 
critical to our forces in the face of a numerically superior 
opponent. 
and simplify the operation of our systems. 
Technology can also be applied to reduce maintenance 
[Ref. 25: p. 61 
Critics also point out that only about 50 percent of 
our combat aircraft are mission capable directly as a result 
of oversophistication. Dr. Perry argues that it is too sim- 
plistic to state that oversophistication is the reason that 
combat aircraft are not mission capable. 
with reliability and maintainability which are blamed on high 
technology are actually the result of older systems in need 
of modernization. 
are having are largely with equipment which was designed in 
the 1950s and 1960s and built in the 1960s and 19705, not 
equipment that incorporates the technology of the 1970s. 
Many of the problems 
According to Dr. Perry, the problems we 
This 1970s technology is not yet in very many of the systems 
we currently have in the field. 
with this new technology, the systems that are replaced 
( F - 4 ' s  and A-7's) will still be in the field into the 1990s. 
We will therefore continue to have these problems. 
does not suggestthat our maintenance and support problems are 
going to get easier in the next 5 years or maybe even the 
next 10 years. 
long term,support problems will ease. 
Even as we deploy the F/A-18 
Dr. Perry 
It will not happen immediately but,over the 
[Ref. 2 5 :  pp. 11-41] 
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While we are applying technology to greatly improve 
the reliability and maintainability of our weapons systems, 
we are faced with growing shortages of qualified maintenance 
personnel. 
training in personnel operating and maintaining equipment 
will tend to decrease over the long run; however, there will 
be an increased requirement in the short term, according to 
Doctor Perry. Specifically, training requirements will in- 
crease over the next five years because of the number of new, 
highly sophisticated systems that will be introduced. 
about the mid-1980s on ,  we should begin to see real benefits 
in terms of operating and maintaining equipment. [Ref. 2 5 :  
The requirements for exceptionally high levels of 
From 
P* 6 1  
3. Impact of Dispersal 
A brief description of support concepts as they exist 
today is pertinent. Aircraft carriers (CV/CVN) operating 
large numbers of CTOL aircraft, have full Organizational ( "0 " )  
and Intermediate (l'It') maintenance capability. These ships 
in essence are full support bases capable of extended periods 
of independent operations. The LPH class ship, though smaller 
in size also has full "0" and ' f I ' f  capability f o r  its embarked 
helicopter force. [Ref. 1 5 :  p. 5 1  
Although fleet operators and maintainers request more 
spare parts and more reliability, they will usually concede 
the present support systems for aircraft 
though highly centralized and complex. 
are efficient, 
The centralization 
5 5  
focuses in the large aircraft carrier, where more and more 
self-contained repair and replacement capabilities have been 
integrated into the ship, each bringing along a train of 
essential requirements for space, repair benches, power, test 
equipment and personnel. [Ref. 16: p. 1081 
In an air-capable Navy where dispersal will prevail, 
a very different maintenance philosophy will emerge. In 
contrast to centralization of repair and storage in the present 
aircraft carrier, a dispersed system requires increased dis- 
tribution o f  aircraft support among several, or even many, 
different ships [Ref. 15: p. 51 .  This concept is in use 
today, where numerous air-capable ships support small-detachment 
helicopter operations with limited numbers of aviation per- 
sonnel, utilizing tailored pack-up kits designed to handle 
most "0" level maintenance demands. Other demands are met 
through augmentation of maintenance and/or supply resources 
from other ships or support sites ashore. [Ref. 15: p. 51 
Clearly, it is not possible to predict with certainty 
the logistics support requirements to the year 2000 and beyond. 
Without question however, the support of dispersed, air-capable 
surface combatants, many equipped with relatively high per- 
formance aircraft, will present formidable logistics challenges. 
[Ref. 1 5 :  p. 11 
The aircraft carrier of today will continue to be a 
major part of naval aviation in the year 2000 [Ref. 50: p. 261.  
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sea-based air missions to be performed by one supersonic and 
two or three subsonic aircraft types, with helicopters still 
playing an important role. 
from 8,000 to 50 ,000  tons may be developed to operate V/STOL 
aircraft. Some of these ships may be limited to five or s i x  
aircraft onboard, others may base 12 to 15 aircraft, while 
the larger ships may carry up to 50 aircraft. [Ref. 5 1 :  p. 11 
A new generation of ships ranging 
The diversity of ship types utilizing V/STOL aircraft 
and the dispersed ship formations utilizing V/STOL aircraft 
will require a greater variation of support capabilities in 
the future. A Seven Echelon Concept (Table I) is envisioned 
to replace today's three levels of maintenance. These seven 
echelons would provide minimal staging capability, three levels 
of organizational capability, two levels of intermediate capa- 
bility, and a depot capability. It is envisioned that this 
concept will provide a cost-effective balance between onboard 
support and external support for any size ship. [Ref. 5 1 :  p. 2 1  
Small ships in the force would have less than today's 
full "0" Level capability, while ships of intermediate size 
might have full "0" Level and no ''1" Level capability. 
ships might be equipped for full "0" Level and partial f ' I" 
Level. In any structure, either somewhere in the force or 
at a nearby shore site, there would be an Aviation Support 
Unit (ASU). The ASU would have spare parts, personnel, and 
test equipment to fill out the missing support functions on 
the small and intermediate size ships. The CV/CVN support 
Other 
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TABLE I :  SUPPORT ECHELON C A P A B I L I T Y  
LOCATION 
0 Host Ship for Staging Operations 
Host Ship for Task Force Dependent 
Operat ions 
0 Host Ship for lndependent Operations (Surge) 
0 Aviation Support Unit 
0 Independent Logistics Support Base 
0 Aviation Support Unit 
0 Independent Logistics Support Base Unit 
0 Aviation Support Unit 
0 Independent Logistics Support Base 
0 Facility Ashore 
0 Aviation Support Unit 
0 Independent Ugintics Support nn-.c 
a Facility Ashore 
HATNTENANCE FUNCTION/LgVEL 
0 Refuel 
0 Ualkarotrnd Preflight 
0 Short-Term Plight Crew Accormodation/Weather Protection 
-- 
ORGANIZATIONAL (3) 
0 Replenishment of all Cansumables and Expendables (Fuel. Ordnance, etc.) 
0 
0 
0 Turnaround and Daily Inspection 
0 Corrosion Control (Uashdoun) 
0 
0 Tethered Propulsion Check 
Faht Isolation Using Airborne Support Equipment Engine Health 
Monitoring System (EHHS)/Built-In-Test (BIT) 
Remve and Replace st the Weapons Replaceahle Assembly (URA) Level-Core 
Avionicn and Flight Essential Systems 




0 Limited Battle Damage Repair Capability including Structures, Hydraulics 
0 Limited Scheduled Maintenance 
Comprehensive Remove and Replace of a11 Hlgh Failure Race WRAs including 
Engine Modules 
Remove and Replace some Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRAs) for Core Avionics 
and other Plight and Mission Essential Subsyetere 
and Safety System 
ORGANIZATIONAL (1) 
a 
9 Complete Scheduled Haintenance includlng Phase Inspections 
Comprehensive Remve and Replace of all Hlgh Failure Rate SRAs 
INTEWDIATE ( 2 1  
Moderate Battle Damage Repair of Structures (including composites) 
0 Aircraft Change/)lorJification Incorporation 
Some Bit and Piece Part Repair Capability 
Fabrication of some High Failure Rate Assemblies 
INTERMEDIATE 1) 
0 Halor Battle Damage Repair of Structures Ayond the Range of Modularity 
0 Fabrication of all Assemblies from Raw Haterial Stocks 
0 
0 Contractor Uaintenance Interface 
DFIPOT 
0 Contractor Maintenance Interface 
Comprehensive Test and Repair of all Renoved WRAS and SRAs 
.- 
Complete Aircraft Rework includins Major Modification and Phased Overhaul 
[Ref.  15: p .  7 1  
operations of today might be relatively unchanged; however, 
the ASU to support the smaller air-capable ships would likely 
be placed on the CV/CVN. [Ref. 51 :  p. 2 1  
Echelon One represents a minimum aircraft refueling/ 
handling capability. Echelon Two is the least capable level 
of support for sustained aircraft operations and would be 
planned for the smaller ships. For increased ship size, 
Echelon Three capability would be added to Echelon Two and 
for still larger ships, Echelons Two, Three, and Four would 
be combined. This progression would apply on up to the CV/CVN 
with Echelons Two through Six. Echelon Seven equates to the 
current Depot Level of maintenance. [Ref. 5 1 :  p. 2 1  
Other required support features would likely include: 
- -  An effective logistics management information and con- 
trol system.[Ref. 1 5 :  p. 81 
- -  Initial outfittin involving packup kits tailored to 
support echelons. f Ref. 15: p. 8 1  
- -  Cross training of personnel in basic tasks to raise 
efficiency of small deck-loadings of aircraft.[Ref. 15: 
P* 8 1  
- -  Consistent maintenance concepts among similar functional 
systems in aircraft and ships to provide logistics ad- 
vantages (hydraulics, communications, computers, and 
navigation equipment are examples.[Ref. 51: p. 2 1  
- -  Resupply by Mobile Logistics Support Force (MLSF) ships. 
This would likely be on a direct basis to each air- 
capable ship in turn (door-to-door), dependent on the 
degree of dispersion. The alternative of replenishing 
CV/CVNs with follow-on replenishment of the smaller 
ships from the CV/CVNs could pull the small air-capable 
ships o f f  station for major portions of their total 
operating time. [Ref. 1 5 :  p. 81 
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- -  High-speed support ships such as Surface Effect Ships 
(SES) would have application in the support forces as 
ASU vessels, for resupply, and for recovery of unflyable 
aircraft from dispersed ships. [Ref. 15: p. 81 
The general maintenance enhancing features currently 
in planning or that will be needed to ensure the success o f  
a dispersed basing concept and V/STOL operation are: 
- -  Inflight performance monitoring of selected parameters 
- -  Automated readout capability of maintenance data 
- -  Fault detection and isolation capability of avionics 
and nonavionics systems to at least the Shop Repairable 
Assembly (SRA) level 
- -  Condition Monitoring of structural components 
- -  Corrosion resistant materials 
- -  Modular design for most systems 
- -  Self start capability 
- -  Accessibility of components 
- -  Logistics communication/data link 
- -  Onboard computers/microprocessors usable for diagnostics. 
The power plants of aircraft utilized in the dispersed 
[Ref. 51: p. 2 1  
concept would most probably have to include the following 
maintenance features: 
- -  Scheduled inspections performed with the power plant 
installed in the aircraft 
- -  Modular power plants, replaceable with minimum personnel 
and support equipment 
- -  Modules and replacement components repairable at the 
intermediate level, with complex component repair ac- 
complished at the depot level. [Ref. 51: p. 31 
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Future weapons systems will attempt to reduce the need 
for Ground Support Equipment (GSE) by designing into the sys- 
tem the required test and support capability. Where this is 
not feasible, a mobile, modularized support capability will 
be required. These GSE packages will have to be designed for 
specific repair tasks with transportable fly-on maintenance 
teams dispatched from the ASU to the dispersed ship [Ref. 
51: p. 51.  
of a 
- -  
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Additional considerations concerning logistics support 
dispersed air-capable Navy are: 
Ship motions will have a greater effect on maintenance 
and supply support operations than they do on flying 
operations (launch and recovery). 
Demographic and social trends indicate declining manpower 
availability to meet the needs of SBA forces circa 2000 
(dispersal will require greater numbers of personnel). 
Support requirements of the future can be met in an 
evolutionary fashion through tailored application and 
enhancement of existent logistics facilities, resources 
and support concepts. [Ref. 15: p. 131 
It is apparent that the concepts and procedures for 
closely coordinating a dispersed concept will originate in 
the LAMPS world. Maintenance and logistics concepts will 
further develop to suit the needs of LAMPS and these concepts 
will serve as forerunners to multi-purpose V/STOL, and to the 
high performance V/STOL forces which may follow closely behind 
[Ref. 16: p. 1011 
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4. Summary 
In recent years, the Navy has been placing greater 
emphasis on the need for reliability and maintainability in 
an effort to improve weapons system readiness. It is envi- 
sioned that this emphasis will result in significant benefit, 
not only for systems just now coming on line, but for future 
systems as well. Problems of readiness undoubtedly will per- 
sist for older systems that will remain a part of the naval 
aviation inventory for years to come. As these older systems 
are phased out, and as technology continues to design relia- 
bility and maintainability into new systems, it is anticipated 
that fewer, less highly trained maintenance personnel will be 
required. On the other hand, complicating aircraft support in 
the future would be the logistics and maintenance support 
challenges posed by an air-capable navy. This concept, employ- 
ing a diversity of ships equipped with relatively high per- 
formance aircraft, will require extensive modification of 
today's logistics support capabilities--possibly including as 
many as seven levels of maintenance. 
The next chapter addresses some of the planning and 
change mechanisms by which naval aviation maintenance attempts 
to prepare for the future. 
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Planning is usually divided into two general concepts: 
Long-range (Strategic) Planning and Functional (Tactical) 
Planning. 
Long-range planning is concerned with change--change in 
the future environment, change in mission, change in tech- 
nology, etc. [Ref. 5 2 :  p. 7 1 .  It is necessary because de- 
cisions can be made only in the present, yet decisions cannot 
be made for the present alone. 
opportunistic decision--let alone the decision not to decide 
at all--may commit an organization for a long period of time, 
if not permanently and irrevocably. 
long-range planning is risk-taking decision making. 
The most expedient, most 
It follows then that 
[Ref. 5 3 :  
P .  5 1  
Long-range planning is less formalized and structured than 
functional planning. 
the most part with factors beyond the organization's control. 
The product is a statement of ends and means. 
It is more intuitive and concerned for 
[Ref. 5 4 :  p .  6 0 1  
By contrast, functional planning initiates getting the 
actual work done that is envisioned in the construction of 
objectives and goals at the long-range planning level. 
tional planning is accomplished to serve an organization's 
Func- 
annual programming and budgeting process--these plans are 
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usually expressed in the form of budgets, schedules and 
procedures [Ref. 55: p. 10-111. 
B. LONG-RANGE PLANNING 
Long-range planning is not forecasting, or masterminding 
the future. It is necessary precisely because organizations 
cannot forecast o r  predict the future. It does not deal with 
future decisions, but rather with the futurity of present 
decisions. The question facing the long-range planner is not 
what the organization should do tomorrow. Rather, it is: 
what should be done today to be ready for an uncertain tomor- 
row? 
It is: what futurity has to be factored into present think- 
ing and doing, what time spans have t o  be considered, - and 
how can this information be used to make good decisions now? -
[Ref. 53: pp. 1-51. Essentially, long-range planning is a 
process by which top managers identify long-term objectives 
and develop broad policies and strategies to assist in acquir- 
ing, allocating and using resources to reach those objectives 
[Ref. 54: p. 601. 
The question is not what will happen in the future. 
--- ---- 
The long-range planning process, besides producing a 
statement o f  ends and means, often has the added benefits of 
assisting in the development of strategic issues, integrating 
and coordinating complex organizations, and stimulating inno- 
vative thinking throughout the organization [Ref. 5 4 :  p .  6 2 1 .  
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1. Office of the Chief o f  Naval Operations (OPNAV) 
As chairman of an ad-hoc committee appointed in 1954  
to study long-range shipbuilding plans and programs, Vice 
Admiral Ralph A.  Ofstie observed: 
"It is too much to expect that the average OPNAV officer, 
heavily burdened with making the best of today's inade- 
quacies, can satisfactorily project himself in odd hours 
into imaginative, yet sound contemplation of another world 
ten or more years hence. If nothing more, his mind will 
be slow to view unfavorably for 1 9 6 5  the type of weapon 
o r  force he is daily supporting as essential for 1 9 5 5  or 
1958."  [Ref. 5 4 :  p .  631 
Although a degree of long-range planning is currently 
accomplished within the general Navy staff structure, the 
pressures of short term demands on small staffs limit the 
scope of what can be accomplished. [Ref. 5 4 :  p. 6 2 1  
In recognition of this problem, the Long Range Plan- 
ning Group (OP-OOX) was established within the OPNAV staff 
on 1 5  January, 1980. 
the Chief of Naval Operations in identifying long-range 
objectives, setting priorities, analyzing alternative 
strategies for achieving the objectives, and evaluating the 
impact of limited resources on future naval capabilities. 
The Director, Long Range Planning Group, is a Staff Assistant 
The purpose of this group is to assist 
reporting directly to the CNO on long-range planning matters. 
[Ref. 56: p .  13 
Within the OP-OOX structure, there are four planners 
representing the following planning areas: 
Politico-military, Resources, and Programs. The Technology 
Technology, 
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Planner, for example, is specifically responsible for: assist- 
ing in the conduct of studies pertaining to the future tech- 
nology environment; analyzing intelligence assessments to 
identify promising Navy technological initiatives; acting as 
a principal liaison between the OP-OOX staff and the civilian 
technological community; coordinating with other staff offices 
in their research and development planning functions, con- 
tributing to CNO policy guidance for the annual Planning, 
Programming, and Budget System (PPBS) cycle. [Ref. 571 
In relating the role of technology to the Navy's need 
for effective long-range planning, CDR G. G. Riggle writing 
for U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings observes: 
"As  yet, one can only speculate about the ultimate impact 
of such developments as precision guided standoff munitions, 
advanced surface hull forms, and powered-lift aircraft on 
the future character of naval warfare. A great deal more 
study and planning certainly will be required before there 
can be any confidence that these o r  other new technologies 
will offer alternatives which are economically affordable 
and operationally desirable. But to wring maximum advantage 
from technological opportunities, a closer relationship 
must be established between the Navy's future capability 
objectives, operational employment concepts, and weapon 
system development and acquisition strategies." [Ref. 54: 
In describing OP-OOX long-range planning, as opposed 
P. 641 
to functional planning within the Navy's Program and Budgeting 
System, Riggle further states: 
"Both [strategic and functional planning] involve similar 
planning procedures, hut while the Long Range Planning 
Group will usually describe preferred outcomes for the 
whole Navy, most existing Navy planning focuses on specific 
action programs designed to produce more precisely defined 
results. Despite these theoretical differences, in prac- 
tice the two forms of planning should be complementary and 










2. OPNAV/Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 
Each warfare mission sponsor in the Navy must annually 
prepare a 20-year plan. The Naval Aviation Plan (NAP) is 
signed jointly by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air 
Warfare) (DCNO ,4IR, OP-05) and by the Commander, Naval Air 
Systems Command. Specifically, the Aviation Plans and Re- 
quirements Division (OP-50) and the Deputy Commander for 
Plans and Programs (AIR-01) are designated as the focal points 
for their respective organizations. [Ref. 58: p. 11 
The NAP is used as the basic aviation planning refer- 
ence for air weapons system research, development and acqui- 
sitions. {Ref. 5 7 :  p. 4 1  It provides guidance to all elements 
of naval aviation f o r  better coordination and focusing of all 
elements toward the aspects of mid and long-range planning 
[Ref. 4: p. 11. Additionally, the NAP is used as a basic 
input to the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) process and 
as the basis for OP-05 submission to the Extended Planning 
Annex (EPA) to the POM. [Ref. 58: p. 4 1  
The NAP is necessitated by the fact that the complexi- 
ties of Naval Aviation require that planning be conducted 
beyond the five-year time span of the POM/Five-year Defense 
Plan (FYDP). This planning must also reflect current policy 
and guidance which is generated annually as a result o f  the 
PPBS process. It is, therefore, necessary that the NAP con- 
tain, as a minimum: 
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I t .  . .current FYDP approved force levels, FYDP procurements! 
modification plans, and 1 5  year extended mission projections 
of those plans which require further definition to meet 
requirements/force levels." [Ref. 58:  p. 11 
The NAP is also designed to provide overall program 
planning guidance to the naval aviation community. The CNO 
policy statement regarding the NAP specifies: 
I 
"It will include objectives and planning data required to 
develop, procure and maintain an aviation force structure 
responsive to current and projected naval roles and threats, 
and will identify long-range requirements. A l l  facets o f  
Naval Aviation will be addressed; i.e., aircraft carriers, 
air stations, aircraft, weapons, and other systems, RDTGE 
(Research, Development, Test and Evaluation), manpower and 
\ 
training, aviation logistics and the ma or studies dealing 
with requirements of force structure." Ref. 58: pp. 1-21 
It is intended that the NAP be used by all segments 
of the aviation community--the planners in OPNAV and Marine 
Corps Headquarters, NAVAIR, and the major fleet aviation 
commands. Additionally, the NAP is meant to serve as a valu- 
able tool in educating the many people who review, or who may 
have an interest in, where naval aviation is headdd and why. 
[Ref. 5 9 :  pp. 8 ,  91  
In updating the NAP, there are basically three data 
sources which are used as guidance. CNO's Program Planning 
Guidance (CPPG), which reiterates Secretary of the Navy and 
Secretary of Defense guidance and provides CNO direction for 
structuring the POM and the longer-range plans. CNO's guid- 
ance prmides the direction which shapes the Navy's future by 
today's actions and the NAP represents the application and 'c 
implementation of this guidance within the aviation community. . a -  
I [Ref. 59:  p .  93 
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The requirements of the fleet are a second source of 
data. One source of information in this area is the Air 
Board which is chaired by OP-05 and is composed o f  senior 
Navy and Marine aviators. The board meets semi-annually to 
discuss policy and problems affecting Naval Aviation. Addi- 
tional sources of information are the requirements submitted 
to OPNAV, and meetings with fleet personnel. [Ref. 59: p .  9 1  
The third source of requirements is generated from 
analysis of the capabilities and age of the current inventory 
of aircraft and weapons systems. From this analysis, a plan 
€or replacement is developed, if required. [Ref. 59: p. 91 
The Naval Aviation Plan is designed as an evolving 
document. Although its basic framework doesn't change yearly, 
it does encompass change which reflects near-term program 
decisions or changes in Secretary of Defense or CNO guidance. 
The essence of the NAP is to provide the basis for under- 
standing the long-range impact of program changes so that 
alternative solutions are ready. [Ref. 59: p .  1 2 1  
C. THE NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE PROGRAM (NAMP) 
1. Background 
The NAMP is promulgated by OPNAV instruction (OPNAVINST) 
4790.2 series which sets forth the maintenance policies, pro- 
cedures and responsibilities for naval aviation maintenance 
at all levels--it is the basic document and authority govern- 
ing the management of all naval aviation maintenance. It 
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delineates command, administrative, and management relation- 
ships and establishes policies and procedures for the assign- 
ment of maintenance tasks and/or responsibilities for the 
conduct of the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program. [Ref. 60: p. 11 
t 
4. 
4 -  
The dynamic nature of the NAMP has resulted in periodic 
revision to the program since it was first established by CNO 
in October 1959. Following its introduction, the three levels 
of maintenance concept and other significant changes have been 
introduced. The Naval Aviation Maintenance and Material Man- 
agement (3M) System was implemented in 1965 to incorporate 
maintenance data collection, man-hour accounting, and aircraft 
accounting systems into the NAMP. OPNAVINST 4790.2 was issued 
in July 1970 to provide a cohesive, command-oriented NAMP 
publication. 
cluding the Maintenance Data Collection Subsystem (MDCS). 
June 1972 a major revision was issued as OPNAVINST 4790.2A. 
This was followed by another revision in October 1979 when the 
format of the document was changed to make the instruction 
This revision was made up of four volumes in- 
In 
more useful at all levels of maintenance management. This 
revision, OPNAVINST 4790.2B, embodies the "stand-alone" 
approach utilizing five separate volumes: 
ing policy, a separate volume for each level of maintenance 
a volume establish- 
( 3 ) ,  and a volume devoted to data processing requirements. 
[Ref. 60: p. 11 
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2 .  Coordination 
The NAMP is under the sponsorship and direction of 
the CNO. Administration is through the chain of command and 
material and technical support is provided by the Chief of 
Naval Material (CNM) and appropriate systems commands. The 
NAMP planning and change process is coordinated through a 
two-tier committee structure. [Ref. 60: p. 3 1  
The Policy Committee is charged with monitoring 
continued development of the NAMP. This committee meets 
annually under the sponsorship of the Director Aviation Pro- 
grams Division (OP-51)  and consists of nine members. The 
Head, Aircraft Maintenance and Material Branch (OP-514)  acts 
as chairman and the committee is composed of representatives t ' *  
from: the Chief of Naval Material; Commander, Naval Air 
Systems Command; Commandant of the Marine Corps; Commander, 
* I  
Naval Air Force, Atlantic; Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific; 
Chief of Naval Air Training; Chief of Naval Reserve; and 
Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command. The Policy Commit- 
tee's primary function is to recommend t o  the CNO policy and 
procedures required for the continued . development, refine- 
ment, and utilization of the NAMP. [Ref. 6 C :  p .  31 
The NMIP Working Committee is also established under 
the sponsorship of the Director, Aviation Programs Division 
( O P - 5 1 ) .  
(OP-514)  or his designated representative, acts as chairman 
of  the N ~ I P  Working Committee. 
The Head, Aircraft Maintenance and Material Branch 
The COItlmittee is composed O f  
7 1  
ten members. Each member of the NAMP Policy Committee appoints 
a representative to serve on the Working Committee. 
tionally, the Commanding Officer, Aircraft Intermediate Main- 
tenance Support Office (AIMSO) appoints a representative t o  
serve on the Working Committee. The committee normally meets 
biannually, or as directed by the chairman. 
Addi- 
[Ref. 6 0 :  pp. 4 - 5 1  
The purpose of biannual Working Committee meetings is 
to assemble an agenda for the Policy Committee, based on 
guidance provided by the Policy Committee the previous year. 
As an example, the Policy Committee decided in September 1981 
that the 1982 theme would deal with aircraft engine support 
improvement. With this guidance, the Working Committee assem- 
bles an agenda of engine-related topics t o  be ruled upon by 
the Policy Committee at a later date. Since there are other 
NAMP issues before the Working Committee, in addition t o  pre- 
paring the Policy Committee agenda,biannual meetings are 
necessary. 
Committee level are assembled into decision packages for 
referral to the Policy Committee. [Ref. 611  
Issues which cannot be decided upon at the Working 
The Commanding Officer, AIMSO, is the coordinator o f  
the NAMP instruction (OPNAV 4 7 9 0 . 2  series). Included in his 
responsibilities is the development and promulgation of rec- 
ommended changes (upon CNO approval). The Navy Maintenance 
and Supply Office (NAVMASSO) provides assistance to AIMSO in 
coordinating the NAMP instruction for Maintenance Data System 
(MDS)  requirements [Ref. 60: p. 61. 
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Modification to OPNAVINST "4790" falls into two main 
categories: 
- Interim Change: A change issued by rapid means (usually 
by message to AIMSO) to correct a procedure, policy, 
practice or situation which adversely affects maintenance, 
aircraft/personnel safety, readiness, or a critical 
function in the NAMP [Ref. 6 2 :  C-11. 
- Change: A modification to the content of OPNAVINST "4790" 
involving a revision of, addition to, o r  deletion of 
existing policies or procedures [Ref. 6 2 :  C-11. 
Fleet units are encouraged to participate in the NAMP 
functional change process utilizing the procedures outlined 
in Appendix C to OPNAVINST "4790" [Ref. 611 .  Recommendations 
to modify the policies/procedures in the NAMP are forwarded 
to AIMSO (Code 5 0 )  via the chain of command [Ref. 6 2 :  p. C-11, 
AIMSO reviews change recommendations and upon completion of 
review either: 
- Returns the change recommendations to the submitting 
activity via the endorsing activities, pending develop- 
ment of additional information/clarification (or cancella- 
tion) or 
- Forwards the change recommendation, including additional 
comments/modification/recommendations developed during 
the review process, to the N M P  Policy Committee members 
and other cognizant activities for review and comments. 
[Ref. 62:  p. C - 2 1  
Following receipt of comments from the NAMP Policy 
Committee members and other appropriate activities, AIMSO 
prepares and submits a consolidated change proposal to CNO 
(OP-51) with recommendations. Upon receipt of the consoli- 
dated change proposal CNO (OP-51)  evaluates and approves or 
disapproves the recommendations. If required, CNO (OP-51) 
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may refer the change proposal to the NAMP Policy or Working 
Committee for further review. 
(OP-51), the change recommendation is returned to AIMS0 and 
Upon final approval by CNO 
the approved change is consolidated into a change package 
and promulgated. [Ref. 6 2 :  p. C - 2 1  
Recommended changes surface (ultimately reaching 
OP-51) in any one of three major ways: 
- Change recommendations submitted at the unit level via 
the chain o f  command. 
- Change recommendations originating through decisions/ 
briefs presented during Working Committee/Policy Committee 
meetings. 
- Change recommendations originating at the headquarters 
level (OPNAV) that move downward. [Ref. 611  
Regardless of whether change recommendations surface 
from user activities, whether they originate from Working/ 
Policy Committee meetings, or whether they originate from 
special information available only at the headquarters level, 
all change recommendations are routed through the review and 
routing process described above. [Ref. 611 
The requirement to evaluate the direction OPNAVINST 
"4790" will take in the future, as well as appropriate sub- 
issues, is specifically addressed through the two-tier commit- 
tee structure. These issues may relate to questions such as: 
- Is OPNAVINST "4790" too detailed? 
- Is it detailed enough? 
- Is it too redundant due to the need to duplicate material 
in the various volumes of the instruction? 
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The Working Committee utilizes a dedicated period of 
time during each biannual meeting session to deliberate issues 
of this nature in order to continue to improve OPNAVINST 
"4790" in a general and systematic way. This process is 
designed t o  reassess the instruction for viability on a re- 
curring basis. [Ref. 631 
With the one exception of the future requirement to 
integrate the Naval Aviation Logistic Command Management In- 
formation System (NALCOMIS) into OPNAVINST "4790" ,  it is 
envisioned, at the OP 514 level, that the change process for 
the instruction will continue to be an evolutionary one. 
Members of the Policy Committee and their representatives 
on the Working Committee will continue to develop an array of 
alternatives for the conduct of the NAMP by considering longer 
range Naval Aviation Maintenance issues in addition to those 
they must deal with in the near-term. [Ref. 631 
D. SUMMARY 
CNO's need of a focal point for strategic planning result- 
ed in the recent establishment (within OPNAV) of the Long 
Range Planning Group (OP-OOX). 
visory capacity to CNO concerning planning matters extending 
far beyond the time limits of the PPBS and Five Year Defense 
Plan. 
This group serves in an ad- 
Within naval aviation, the Deputy Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions (Air Warfare) and the Commander, Naval Air Systems 
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Command coordinate mid and long-range planning efforts through 
their respective planning focal points (OP-SO and AIR-01). 
The product of this joint planning effort is the Naval Avia- 
tion Plan, which is made available to all elements of naval 
aviation in order that the various aspects of mid and long- 
range planning may be better coordinated. 
The particular planning and change requirements associated 
with the Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NmP) are the 
ultimate responsibility o f  OPNAV. 
series) planning and change process is effected in an evolu- 
tionary manner, through a two-tiered committee structure 
under the sponsorship of OP-51. 
originated as a result of: 
tives; decisions/briefs presented during NAMP Committee meet- 
ings; unit level submissions via the chain of command. 
Additionally OPNAVINST "4790" is systematically reassessed 
for general viability through the deliberative processes of 
the NAMP Working Committee. 
The NAMP (OPNAVINST 4 7 9 0 . 2  
Change recommendations are 
headquarters level (OPNAV) initia- 
These then, are the general organizationallprocedural 
processes through which naval aviation maintenance prepares 
for and implements change. 
ment's" views (Senior level Aeronautical Maintenance Duty 
Officers) concerning the naval aviation maintenance change 
process is presented in the next chapter. 
A compilation of "Senior Manage- 
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IV. SENIOR MANAGEMENT'S VIEW OF THE CHANGE PROCESS 
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Selection o f  questionnaire Recipients 
In order to determine how senior level management 
views the change process in Naval Aviation Maintenance, a 
questionnaire was designed to provide selected indicators 
for appraisal of the naval aviation maintenance change process. 
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was sent to all 
captains and commanders holding Aeronautical Maintenance Duty 
Officer designators (1520). Of 65 questionnaires administered, 
40  were completed and returned by 2 0  captains and 20 command- 
ers. An analysis of the responses contained in these 4 0  
questionnaires is presented in this chapter. 
2 .  Design of Questionnaire 
A discussion of the reasoning for, and wording of, 
the questions contained in the questionnaire is considered 
appropriate f o r  clarity of purpose. 
the insight into question meanings, and their relevance t o  
the appraisal o f  the Naval Aviation Maintenance Change process. 
Of prime importance is 
The first, second and third questions are empirical 
questions bearing on the future; how much change can be ex- 
pected, in what areas, and how will it affect naval aviation 
maintenance. 
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Question four asks how the respondent views the current 
naval aviation maintenance environment (including NAMP) as it 
relates t o  the following facets of the change process: Plan- 
ning for Change, Vertical Communication (top-down), Vertical 
Communication (bottom-up), Dealing with Resistance t o  Change, 
and Implementation of Change. 
solicit experienced opinion concerning what is right, as well 
as what is wrong, with the current naval aviation maintenance 
This question was designed to 
environment. 
Question five asks: "What do you consider to be im- 
pediments to change within the naval aviation maintenance 
environment?" This question was designed to draw out specific 
problems that are best identified by experienced, senior level 
management. 
Question six asks: "In your view, how can the current 
This question was designed to change process be improved?" 
sample top management's thinking on possible redesign of the 
current process. 
It was not the intention o f  the authors t o  solicit a 
"negative" commentary on the aviation maintenance change 
process. 
with less bias toward "what are we doing wrong?", and more 
emphasis toward "what are we doing right?" It is a credit 
to the respondents that, in many instances, both the positive 
and negative aspects of a particular area were addressed. 
Perhaps the questionnaire could have been written 
Since the purpose of this thesis is to serve as a 
forum/instrument for discussion for the 1 5 2 0  community, it 
is the opinion of the authors that highlighting problem areas 
would prove beneficial for improving the effectiveness of 
naval aviation maintenance. 
The casual reader, not directly involved in the naval 
aviation maintenance environment, should understand that the 
many successfully implemented changes to naval aviation main- 
tenance have not been addressed. Without question, naval 
aviation maintenance has been very successful in the mainte- 
nance of highly complex equipment. As is the case in any 
complex management system, there is always room for improvement. 
3 .  Methodology 
Quantifiable questionnaire data were tabulated in 
bar-graph form to summarize responses. 
to quantify or weight respondents' written comments. 
No attempt was made 
B. RESPONDENTS' VIEW OF THE FUTURE 
The degree of technological change envisioned by the 
respondents over the next 10 year, and 10 to 2 0  year time 
frames is presented in Figures 4 - 1  and 4 - 2 .  Respondents' 
comments concerning technological change follow the figures. 
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Figure 4-2. Degree of technological change expected next 
10 to 2 0  years. ( %  of respondents) 
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Figures 4-1 and 4-2 reflect a consensus t h a t  significant 
technological change will be experienced in Naval Aviation 
Maintenance to the year 2000. Respondents' comments in this 
area are listed as follows: 
8 0  
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"Technological change rate will increase in the future, 
not decrease, as major advances are made in the state- 
of-the-art .... we must learn to deal better and faster 
with it. Our advantage in the future will lie in tech- 
nology, not quantity." 
"...changes in technology will be driven somewhat by afford- 
ability. We need to insure that maintenance technology 
changes as rapidly as system and equipment technology--any 
large disparity, and readiness will turn into a negative 
number .I' 
"R 6 D money is not being spent on technology for aviation 
maintenance .... 1 1  
"Every sign points directly to new technological advances 
in our aviation maintenance and material management arena. 
I think that the significant growth in both use and utility 
of data processing equipment at the organizational and 
intermediate levels will force this change. Certainly the 
manner of maintaining the airfoil, engine and avionics 
equipments will be driven by this new technology. My only 
concern is that we do not allow the technology to overcome 
us by continuing the present policy of not training our 
enlisted and officer talent in the fleet to deal with the 
technology; thereby making us victims of myriad contractor 
and civil service technicians aboard our ships." 
Question 2 ,  "What degree of personnel change do you think 
can be expected in Naval Aviation Maintenance?", is a logical 
follow-on to question 1. Respondents are afforded an opportu- 
nity to link a perception of significant technological change 
over the next 20 years to the personnel resources which will 
be required to cope with new technology. 
4-6 represent the respondents' views on "personnel change" 
Figures 4-3 through 
in four areas: 
- the quality of maintenance personnel over the next 10 years. 
- the quality of maintenance personnel over the next 10-20 




- the quantity o f  maintenance personnel over the next 
Question 2 elicited a wide range of expectations with the 
predominant view indicating moderate change in quality during 
the next 10 year and 10 to 2 0  year periods, with little to 
moderate change in quantity during the next 10 year and 10 
to 20 year periods. 
change were approximately equally divided. 
sponses are depicted in Figures 4 - 3  through 4 - 6  below, with 
sub j ect ive comments f o l  lowing. 
10-20 years. 
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Figure 4 - 3 .  Degree of change in personnel quality next 
10 years. ( %  o f  respondents) 
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Figure 4-4. Degree of change -in personnel quality next 10 to 
20 yrs. ( %  of respondents) 
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Figure 4-5. Degree of change in personnel quantity next 
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Figure 4-6. Degree of change in personnel quantity next 10 to 
20 yrs. ( %  of respondents) 
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,'I do not think that aviation is going to attract more of 
the available talent in the future than it does today. I 
do not necessarily agree with the position of the burea- 
cracy that says we need more talent. I think we have the 
talent in both our officer and enlisted ranks in aviation 
maintenance, but we do a poor j o b  of making them aware and 
capable of coping with the technology. It is awfully dif- 
ficult for a good man to be afforded an opportunity to 
obtain any training. I think we sometimes take the second 
team and train them because the first team has to keep the 
airplanes flying. There must be a plan that is sacred in 
how we train and utilize our fleet maintenance officers. 
I am speaking specifically of  the 1520s and L D O s ,  and how 
we train and utilize the aviation enlisted ratings. I 
submit that there is no plan or at best an unworkable plan." 
"I don't see aviation maintenance getting more people in 
the near future. The trend, if any, is the opposite di- 
rection. 'Contracting out' is politically popular. I 
look for the quality of our people to improve as the civil- 
ian school systems get their act together and get back to 
basics. " 
"Personnel quality must increase--current ' A '  school grad- 
uates do not have even the most basic skills. From E - 4  
thru E - 7  we need hands on technicians not - leaders. If our  
personnel were skilled we would not require 45 technical 
representatives when a CV goes to sea. Additionally, we 
would not require tech assists when benches fail." 
"I continue to be optimistic that each succeeding genera- 
tion will be better educated and more scientifically ori- 
ented; accordingly, I believe the quality o f  officers (1520) 
and enlisted group IX maintenance ratings will be higher 
in the next 10-20 years. Contradictorily, I suspect the 
quantity to remain relatively stable or even to decline." 
"The quantity and quality of maintenance personnel. will go 
down as less qualified, intuitive individuals are attracted 
to maintenance; (less 1 8 - 2 4  yr. olds available next 10-20 
yrs.). The incentives for young maintainers are not there." 
"I think there's going to be some accommodation to weapons 
systems that are deployed independently. There is no doubt 
in my mind that the key to their readiness will be in dura- 
bility and high reliability. As we grow to 15 Carrier Wings 
there certainly will be an expansion of those in support 
roles to match the fleet's needs, but other than that, I 
don't see a proliferation in either maintenance enlisted 
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personnel or officers in squadrons or staffs. 
every reason to believe that billets might be cut if we 
could achieve a higher state of readiness training among 
our maintenance crews. My view is that a lot of the staff 
work is caused by squadrons with inadequate skills. Per- 
haps with increased retention and recruiting we'll be able 
to attract and retain a higher skill base than we've had 
in the last decade." 
There's 
"Every officer will not be C N O ,  Admiral, or Captain; some 
will not make 05/04 and the only way we will ever be able 
to choose future leaders will be to l o o k  for the innova- 
tors, iconoclasts, and those who have the visionary approach- 
es to solve maintenance problems--not those who can follow 
cookbook tactics as though they were robots." 
Having addressed technological and personnel change, it 
is logical to determine to what degree senior management 
perceives a resulting change to the organizational structure. 
A correlation of the degree o f  change to organizational 
structure envisioned by the respondents, over the next 10 
year, and 10 to 20 year periods, is presented in Figures 4 - 7  
and 4 - 8 .  
Moderate Change 
Little Change 
1 I I I I I I I I I 
1 I . t 
1 0  20 30 4 0  50 60  70  80 9 0  1 0 0  % 
Figure 4 - 7 .  Degree of change to organizational structure 
expected next 10 yrs. ( %  of respondents) 
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Figure 4 - 5 .  Degree of change to organizational structure 
expected next 10 to 20 years. ( %  of respondents) 
Clearly, the consensus is that there will be little change 
in the naval aviation maintenance organizational structure 
over the next 10 years with little to moderate change from 
10 to 20 years out. Respondents' comments concerning change 
in organizational structure are as follows: 
"We have been over organizational structure much too often 
over the past years. I think we have a good baseline with 
the three levels of maintenance concept and I would hope 
that we will keep the organizational, intermediate and 
depot levels of maintenance basically as they are now. My 
concern is, however, primarily with the 041 level. There 
I feel that budget constraints will drive us to consolidate 
our maintenance organizations ashore more than we have in 
the past. !lLso, aboard ship, we are going to have to l o o k  
at different performance standards to measure readiness. 
We must talk about intermediate maintenance activity (IMA) 
because the IMA includes supply, facilities, equipment, 
and many other elements that are beyond the capability of 
an AIMD officer to deal with. The 'bottom line' is that 
the organization is good, we ought not to change it to 
solve the problem, but we ought to make certain that we 
understand which functions are 0-level, which functions are 
I-level, and then train people for those functions and put 
them in that spot. 
my judgment, and we do a very poor j o b  of matching the 
skills required to the mission placed on the squadron or 
AIMD. " 
We do a very poor j o b  of detailing in 
86 
"The organizational structure can be changed to more clear- 
ly define actual skill, pay grade, training and numbers 
required--if we permit the management skills in the personnel 
field to actually and realistically define their procedure 
requirements. SHOROC, ACMO Series and other measurement 
standards need to be taught to the maintenance manager who 
may then assist in the identity of requirements. 
these factors we should be better prepared to staff to 
actual requirements." 
"Little or no change to organizational structure; however, 
there is room for personnellorganization reductions if 
forced to that choice.'' 
Given all 
"Cost will make changes to organizational structure manda- 
tory--we may have two flying squadrons maintained by one 
organizational unit. Maximize both tools and talent. 'I' 
level may increase in size to reduce pipeline assets and 
transportation cost . I '  
"Changes are controlled primarily by people, not organiza- 
tional structures. With bureaucracy naturally resistant 
to change, only through intelligent strong leadership at 
the top supported by progressive individuals throughout 
the bureaucracy will change come about." 
"I believe the current organizational structure is relative- 
ly sound. 
levels of management. More visibility for 061 levels in 
the budget would force this issue." 
"...we resist change in organizational structure probably 
more than in any other area. I don't see much change in 
the future. However, I think we should look at the staff 
area. I think we have too many staffs who's only product 
is paper; who add absolutely nothing to operational 
readiness ." 
We need more knowledgeable personnel at higher 
C. RESPONDENTS' VIEWS OF THE CURRENT CHANGE PROCESS 
No section of the questionnaire produced a wider range 
of opinions/comments than did question 4. This question solic- 
ited respondents' views concerning the current naval aviation 
maintenance environment, including NAiiP, as it relates to the 
following facets of the change process : 
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- Planning for Change 
- Vertical Communication (top-down) 
- Vertical Communication (bottom-up) 
- Dealing with Resistance to Change 
- Implementation of Change 
Correlated responses are presented in Figures 4-9 through 
4-13. Following each table are respondents' comments per 
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Figure 4-9. Planning for Change. 
( S  of  respondents) 
"I would add to the NAVP process an element called long 
range planning, brainstorming, research and development, 
aviation maintenance in the year 2000, o r  whatever you 
choose to call it. Yesterday's wildest dreams may be 
tomorrow's policy. We need to be more in tune with the 
operational planning instead of following along after the 
fact. It's difficult to get an operational planner to 
think about maintenance, let alone spell it. What kind 
o f  maintenance will we have/should we have in the year 2000?  
Will we have robots in our AIMD's; will we have 'Star Trek' 
and 'Battle Star Galactica' technology? Will we even be 
able to afford naval aviation and aircraft carriers in the 
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year Z O O O ?  
will also find the carrier an expensive item. We should not 
hesitate to take a bold and challenging l o o k  into the future. 
I would l o o k  to our bright young junior officers to do this. 
There is no such thing as a dumb idea; some are just ahead 
of their time ." 
The British couldn't and I suspect the Russians 
"...we normally do not see plans in the field. Plans are 
not well formulated to include all required elements." 
"We never plan enough, we certainly never communicate enough 
(although we think we do) and implementation is always too 
slow. I don't know how to make it better." 
"We are for the most part, very poor at planning for change. 
We preach that all ILS elements must be accounted for before 
changes take place, i.e. new equipment, programs, etc. But 
we always seem to implement with 'can do' before we're com- 
pletely ready because 'operators' are in the driver's seat." 
"Planning for change is 'unsatisfactory' ... The strength of 
useless organizations in resisting their demise is unparal- 
leled, unwarranted and unwanted. No easy cure in sight." 
"I think by looking at the entire maintenance logistics 
program we see a pitiful situation caused by fragmented 
and conflicting responsibilities at the very top levels 
between OPNAV, AIMSO, NAVMAT, NAVAIR, NALC, CINC's, TYCOMS, 
FUNCWINGS. We need to hire a surgeon quickly before this 
proliferation of responsibilities spreads . I '  
"It appears to me that [higher levels] do not do a very 
good job of planning for changes and adequately funding 
changes far enough in advance." 
"This question reached to the heart of our problem. Plan- 
ning for change is mission impossible because of the in- 
dividual interests that exist primarily in the Washington 
environment . . . .  I have been on the cutting edge of trying 
to be visionary over the years, and I quite honestly re- 
flect and say-is it worth it? The Navy has allowed itself 
to become mired by the bureaucracy of civil service in 
most areas, and the 'blue suits' are not in charge of their 
own destiny. That statement is not made lightly. I wish 
I felt differently, but I do not know how to say it anymore 
truthful ly . 'I 
"A7 FLIR, F/A-18, TARPS, SIDMS, HARPOON .... all examples of 
limited support, limited training/pubs, undertrained and 
late arrival of personnel, yet operators pushing for full 
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utilization. Over 300 cross deck items required, o f  major 
support equipment, to get CVs back in shape t o  support 
Airwing with new aircraft....Down 50 personnel in AIMD 
during TYT . . . .  Very short AVCAL depth or range .... Trying to 
do too much with too little." 
The above comments would indicate that planning f o r  change is 
perceived to be a weak area in the naval aviation maintenance 
environment. 
Communication, both up and down the chain o f  command, 
evoked an equal number of diverse comments. 
communications rated slightly higher than the other sub areas 
o f  question 4. 
responses in the area of communication. 
Overall, however, 
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Figure 4-10. Vertical Communication (top-down). 
( %  of  respondents) 
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Figure 4-11. Vertical Communication (bottom-up). 
( %  of resyondents) 
"The NAMP, though a travesty upon the precept of briefly 
stating policy, is the best vehicle we have and we use it 
well. We must contain the content of the NAMP to keep it 
usable at the worker level. Communication down needs to 
improve. 
fleet without fleet input. Communication up is worse due 
to apparent inefficiencies of the staff levels. 
in the process of overcoming the inertia of resistance to 
change. 
Too many decisions are made which affect the 
We are 
Wish us luck (spelled w-o-r-k) ." 
"How can there be any vertical communication when no one 
can decide who's in charge?" 
"Vertical communications from the top down--if we could 
ever find out who had the helm and who was giving us the 
direction, we could then allude to communication from the 
top down." 
"Communication from the bottom up--it tries and we get all 
of our efforts set up, but we have so  many folks trying to 
perpetuate their own ego without concern for the big pic- 
ture of the Navy. Priorities of endeavor are often deter- 
mined by what is best for me and my present role." 
"Improve communication. 
communicate new ideas and those ideas must be received and 
acted upon in a timely manner; after which, timely and 
meaningful feedback must take place in order t o  stimulate 
more ideas . ' I  
There must be an easier way to 
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"We can improve our communications in the 1520 community 
by working together to meet our future needs. I think 
this is being done now better than ever. 
long way to go--but we are getting there." 
Again, we have a 
Dealing with resistance t o  change is a difficult concept 
to evaluate. The term smacks of academic "organization theory" 
and is difficult to deal with objectively. The fact that 
resistance t o  change exists, or is perceived to exist, is 
borne ou t  by the majority of the respondents' comments in this 
area. Figure 4-12 correlates responses concerning this topic, 
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Figure 4-12. Dealing with Resistance to Change. 
( %  of respondents) 
"Resistance to change has always been advertised as High 
at the working (fleet) level, when in fact that is not as 
true as it is at higher levels .... New ideas are difficult 
to sell with budget demands and promotion risks associated 
with new ideas . ' I  
"Dealing with resistance to change is difficult because we 
really have not and do not make significant changes in our 
organization. Our priorities are still based on the old 
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standards; i.e. cats, traps, flight hours, sorties, etc. 
If top management can institute real world change in our 
system then we may see other echelons accept change more 
easily." 
"A lot of our maintenance and logistics problems are defi- 
nitely a result of too much change in Logistic/Maintenance 
support systems. Because of weak headquarters discipline, 
field activities are burdened with far too many unique 
systems that circumvent the Navy supply and maintenance 
program. An advantage to these programs is usually their 
'dollar fenced' budget so they don't suffer from the sys- 
tem's unfunded backlog. For example, the Navy has great 
difficulty competing with contractor maintenance because, 
where implemented, it's 100% or more funded. The rest of 
the Navy shows a prioritized deficit. Who wouldn't vote 
for [contractor maintenance] under those circumstances?" 
"In the field, my perspective is that we have brought in 
a lot of change where there's actual hardware involved. 
People in technical skill areas have done a creditable 
j o b .  We lead the world in high performance airplanes and 
our technology is unsurpassed. The fact that the designers 
probably could have done simpler things shouldn't detract 
from the achievements they have made. Our weakness is not 
with those in squadrons and air wings that carry the burden 
of aviation maintenance everyday; our weakness is back in 
the Washington arena, where naval aviation maintenance has 
traditionally been a stepchild. Only now are we developing 
career maintenance officers with the professional tools to 
deal with these problems at the higher levels .... there are, 
however, few people who want to grow to serve in Washington 
because of frustrations there. . . .  there appears to be no 
discipline, or at least very little, among the incumbents. 
Each one, by himself, is-a well equipped, well trained, 
highly innovative officer. 
destructive impulses; that goes for organizations as well. 
Someone must assume the lead and some must follow. The 
leader has yet to emerge." 
"There are many proposed changes to the way we do business 
which must -be resisted (e.g., contracting out, emasculating 
the TAD concept, etc.) There are other changes that must 
be pushed (e.g., NALCOMIS; present CNO initiatives on drug 
abuse; pride and professionalism; control of fraud, waste, 
and abuse, etc.). Technological change is easy compared 
to the others." 
But not many of us have self 
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Figure 4 - 1 3  correlates responses to the change process 
as it relates to "fmplementation of Change", with respondents 
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Figure 4 - 1 3 .  Implementation of Change. 
( %  o f  respondents) 
"Implementation of change is generally good. 
have been implemented in the fleet with creditable success 
despite their early deployment in some cases. Implementa- 
tion of organizational change is unsatisfactory." 
New systems 
"Implementation of change--if you have a specific change, 
we are good at that. 
broad objectives/determinations. 
the high degree of fragmentation in our community (1520). 
No one can tell me who is really in charge and whose drum 
we march t o .  
aviation maintenance material management. Actually, spe- 
ci f ical l y  , OP - 5 1. 
But we are only fair at the strategic 
I think this is due to 
OP-05 should be the pinnacle of power for 
" . . . I  believe we generally do a good to excellent job in 
this area, but we often move at glacial speed despite the 
dynamics of the NAMP." 
"Decision process is hard--not implementation." 
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Question 5 solicited senior management's views concerning 
impediments to change within the naval aviation maintenance 
environment. This is necessarily a negative question; how- 
ever, the range of answers given by the respondents reflect 
both positive and negative aspects. It is difficult to find 
a common thread among all the responses. Subjective comments 
are as follows: 
"Good change--dumb people; bad change--smart people . . . .  
Where dollars are required, change in the maintenance 
world, especially on the management side, will come slowly 
and will require a lot of energy to bring about. This is 
because of the priority order of things military, and I 
have difficulty disagreeing with that. There are, however, 
many new ideas--cheap ones--yet t o  be surfaced out in the 
fleet which can and will improve management in the future . . . .  
the NAMP change process is a good one. Suggested changes 
get aired thoroughly and ruled on relatively quickly." 
"Having too many people in decision making positions who 
have spent too much of  their naval or civilian careers 
in D . C .  and don't know what the operating forces are like. 
They appear to resist changes because they don't under- 
stand what's happening in the fleet." 
"Surely one of the impediments to change is euphemistically 
called 'rice bowling'. The aviation maintenance program 
development, to a degree, is tied to the civil service 
system. You cannot hire people one year and fire them the 
next simply because somebody hasn't .... figured o u t  the 
correct way to organize to begin with. 
we have in Naval Aviation Support Administrative billets 
are experts at holding on to their jobs and the status 
quo and something has to be done about that. 
blame it on the civil servants, I blame it on those who 
have created all these organizations with overlapping 
responsibilities--and I'm being charitable when I say 
overlapping ." 
"Impediments to overall change, as I see them, are directly 
related to our attitude and acceptance of less than directed 
implementation. 
under the Maintenance Data System which has been with us 
for over 15 years. 
The people [civilian] 
But I don't 
We are still not satisfactorily reporting 
I feel we really do not provide an 
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adequate transition to make a change and therefore fre- 
quently operate a new system under old rules--which defeats 
any change. 
"A bureaucracy feeds on itself and few people want to admit 
their job may not be needed. If the energy expended in 
keeping bureaucracies alive was aimed at improving air- 
craft readiness we would gain a lot." 
"Short range management, conservatism, lack of proper 
visibility, lack of knowledge, budget process from Congress 
down encourages cuts in operation 6 Maintenance Navy (OGMN) 
accounts because cuts are immediately evident; no political 
support for OGMN budgets as compared with big production 
dollars and present unwritten philosophy o f  senior managers 
of 'don't make waves'." 
"...personal attitude of many managers makes the change 
system appear to be less than effective. Short range 
solutions may sometimes be required to keep the business 
going,but long term solutions are frequently not explored 
because to do so is not expedient compared to the other 
important things which must be dealt with. Well planned, 
long term solutions for many of our problems would assist 
us in the change process area." 
"I feel that the greatest impediment to change is the vast -
size of the organization vs. the austere funds we have to 
run it." 
"The bureaucracy of government. We are not able to respond 
to the needs of the Fleet in a timely manner due to limita- 
tions imposed by regulations. Mainly in the areas of per- 
sonnel and material support. We haven't done well in keeping 
up with the need for ADP service either. Too many restric- 
tions on acquiring local computer systems." 
"There are too many in influential positions that support 
only their own philosophies. There is no sense of unity, 
i.e. east and west coast navies." 
"Impediments to change result from the different views 
held by the major claimants ( A I R P A C ,  A I R L A N T ,  CNAVRES) ." 
"The elements underlying impediments to change are: 
A .  We haven't done it that way before. 
B. What we have now works--why screw it up. 
C. It was good enough for Orville and Wilbur .... 
D. Why should we change that when we don't know i f  a 
new system will work better?" 
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"A total cohesive organization is lacking (i.e. LANT vs. 
PAC, NAVAIR vs. NAVMAT, NALC vs. NAEC). 
together at the top level of management." 
We don't work 
"We feel good (comfortable) with the 'status quo'. 'Don't 
rock the boat' .... '  my responsibility--my area--hands off.' 
-Maintenance is the 'stepchild o f  procurement'. 
-We put out fires instead of solving the basic problem 
"Impediments to change caused by lack of understanding of 
direction we need to go, of positive attitude toward 
needed change, a better understanding o f  communication 
problems between old breed and new breed coming up." 
by changing the system." 
"There are no impediments to change; however, the changes 
take a while to be promulgated because of time required to 
print and distribute the change and any required software." 
"Impediments are generally not the change itself. The 
change is the easiest part. The dollars and people require- 
ments associated with any change are the driving force 
behind implementation. Software is also a strong element 
in determining when implementing a change can be accomplished." 
". ..ILS elements are not sufficiently coordinated together 
to achieve the best, smoothest introduction of a weapons 
system. Such things as 'changes in policy' or 'procedures' 
go smoother and require only time--to change habits and 
get the word out to all levels." 
"Impediments to change are caused by disunity among planners 
at the 0-6 level--parochialism. But on the whole, changes 
progress rather easily in most cases." 
"Impediments to change are caused by lack o f :  
-Funding 
-Understanding of the Fleet's needs by the upper echelon 
decision makers ." 
"We tend to try and start new programs while requiring 
management to continue old processes at the same time. As 
a result, some of the bad habits continue and the new 
process never gets fully implemented." 
"-Complexity of organization. 
-The requirement of getting a number of offices to concur 
when individual interests vary to some degree. 
-At times, human nature dictates a resistance to change, 
especially when we consider the 'not-invented-here' 
syndrome. '' 
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"Apart from personalities, the single major impediment 
to change is, in my view, our slow acceptance/development/ 
implementation of automated MIS's; this is compounded today 
by the incredible number of ADP wickets to be hurdled." 
"...The major impediments to change, are the changes them- 
selves; their width, depth and volume to the point that 
the average sailor has to be repeatedly trained over to 
be advanced in rate." 
"The biggest impediment to change within the aviation 
maintenance environment in my judgment, is the organiza- 
tional hierarchy that is in place in Washington that you 
must deal with every day. When I say Washington, I am 
addressing Washington and all of its field activities. It 
is totally controlled,in my judgment,by civilians who in 
most cases have never been to sea and are not going to 
sea, do not understand the environment that we must operate 
in and are not willing to learn. I have heard the song 
you need them for continuity until I am sick at my stomach. 
Yes, you need the continuity, but if you do minimal per- 
sonnel management, you can maintain continuity whet.her you 
are dealing with military or civilians. Until the 'blue 
suit'gets back in charge of his destiny in CNM and NAVAIR 
and all o f  the associated field activities, you will con- 
tinue the blood bath as being the only road to change .... 
[upper levels] perform duplicated functions. You can find 
1,000 people that can say 'NO,' but you can never find that 
one responsible individual that can say 'Make it s o . '  
Washington runs by committee and that is unfortunate." 
Specific comments regarding the NAMP are as follows: 
"There are faults in our system and improvement can be 
made. We have experienced and knowledgeable people in 
each echelon in the decision and/or management system. 
It is o u r  responsibility to make the system work in each 
case or to change the system to one that is achievable. 
What we need is in the NAMP or complimenting instructions. 
We also know the chain of command to institute change. A 
recent Navy-wide survey indicates the NAMP 'as i s '  is an 
excellent document, providing all required information in 
the proper format and only needs 'fine tuning' to make it 
better. That is our present tasking and we need to support 
the request for inputs ." 
"The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program, as originally 
conceived and developed in 1968, was to have a Navy-wide 
standard policy and procedures document that could be 
utilized, in the broadest terms, to answer questions to 
problems in 95% of the cases appearing before the average 
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maintenance officer on a day-to-day basis. Major mainte- 
nance programs and supporting elements of logistic support 
were to be blended into a document that headquarters per- 
sonnel, fleet personnel and the shore establishment could 
equally utilize for guidance and management of those pro- 
grams. Once the document was published in 1 9 7 0  there were 
to be relatively few changes--a concept that seems to have 
fallen by the wayside. Later, during the mid-seventies 
it became painfully evident virtually every change was a 
complete overhaul of the document to the point that an 
intrinsic interest, by working maintenance people, could 
not be engendered for proper documentation procedures. 
Today, 10 years later, I see no trend toward decreasing 
the amount of changes on an annual basis. Users of the 
document could not have, until recently, cared less what 
was in the document. With the advent of NAMP PQS (AWS), 
this may change; however, they will have to turn in their 
wings each time a change is promulgated." 
"The NAMP may be too large to ensure wide ranging updating 
and understanding. All directions are usually modified 
and changed. 
"Althouqh large strides have been made in 'ease of change' 
to [NAMP] we have a long way to go. Most people in the 
fleet feel it is almost too hard to originate and get a 
change to the NAMP implemented." 
"[The] NAMP has been written in blood over the years. It 
is the best program in existence today. The NAMP has gone 
through many iterations to reach its present form and is 
constantly being revised and updated." 
"The 4 7 9 0  is a standardization manual. It's value relative 
to any of the five questions asked is only 'fair'. Most 
change needed is instituted by fleet activities and finally 
distributed or standardized by NAMP. Very little direct 
influence is seen by the NAMP which causes change." 
"The NAMP appears to be such an impenetrable document that 
it inhibits change in every quarter." 
"If I were in charge of the NAiiP, I would restrict the gross 
weight of the document. 
to perform a hunt and kill task on the NAMP, they could 
eliminate 30% of the redundancy and specificity of telling 
today's maintenance officer how to do his job. As I talk 
to young 1 5 2 0  maintenance officers z e y r e h a g r i n e d  at 
the lack of initiatives they can pursue and envision coming 
under the cookbook approach of the Air Force,where one's 
time is utterly consumed by avoiding deviations to step-by- 
step instructions . ' I  
I feel that if a board were picked 
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"A significant improvement to the 4 7 9 0 . 2  change process 
will accrue with NAMP automation, i.e. getting it on a 
word processor. " 
"Timeliness of changes is deplorable.. . 1 2 - 1 8  months. Por- 
tions of the NAMP written by various individuals exhibit 
engineering background or technical background, etc. Let's 
put NAMP changes into a word processing system which will 
provide for homogeneity of content and assist maintenance 
workers in understanding the content. Timeliness could 
also be enhanced by transmitting change programs by CRT 
terminals." 
"In the case of the NAMP, we need to speed up the part of 
the process from decision to actual implementation. That's 
being worked on. Other major changes require pure 'dog 
work'--complete staffing, getting our (your) stuff together 
and convincing the right people it's the smart and necessary 
thing to do. We've lost battles in the past for lack of 
the above plus follow up. There are too many people who 
can say no and too few who can say yes." 
"The change process as I know it is a good one and becoming 
smoother as time goes by. I would leave it alone for 3 or 
4 more years." 
"The formal NAMP change process presently in use serves us 
well. It's better than anything we had or did in the past. 
It may seem a bit slow but that's not all bad--we make very 
few dumb decisions. However, we should always look to 
progress. Change and progress are not necessarily the same." 
"Within Naval Aviation Maintenance no change to the present 
process is required. Change occurs to meet new needs--our 
system is flexible. '' 
"There are too many things/programs in maintenance which 
require/need change but the NAMP is - not one of them." 
D. RESPONDENTS' VIEWS ON IMPROVING THE CHANGE PROCESS 
The following list of suggestions to improve the change 
process, while not exhaustive, covers numerous areas which 
may possibly serve as a basis for formulating specific change 
recommendations. Some of these suggestions would require 
the efforts of many people to staff/implement, both in and 
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out of the aviation maintenance community. Clearly, other 
suggestions may not be feasible for various reasons. 
change recommendations, however, might be implemented with 
relative ease. Senior level commentary and suggestions for 
Other 
improving the change process are as follows: 
"The change process has noticeably improved over the past 
8 to 10 years. Encouragement of those who recognize prob- 
lems and have some idea for resolution of the problems is 
our only real hope o f  getting to the heart of the issue. 
Expeditious processing o f  proposed changes with feedback 
to the originator might improve the process. I do have 
some question as to whether we can expect any significant 
improvement in the change process and certainly have no 
innovative ideas as to how it can be improved." 
"Appoint a standing board whose responsibility encompasses 
aviation maintenance in its entirety--responsible for 
reviewing the problems, the future, and coming up with 
action to take care of the problem--meet quarterly--members 
t o b e t o p  level management - and middle level (must be)." 
"Reduce review process. If TYCOMS agree and NAVAIR says 
0.K.--change it." 
"You can o n l y  change the current process by putting the 
military back in charge and having them exercise leader- 
ship of the first order, and n o t  leadership by committee, 
but leadership--make the decisions. Secondly, you must 
streamline the organization by consolidation and significant 
reduction in the number of diverse contractors employed. 
Thirdly, you have to force integration of aviation supply 
into aviation maintenance. And fourthly, you must attack 
the fragmented programs which divert resources, energy 
and attention from the maintenance system." 
"-Develop human engineering into computer applications. 
plementation . . .  eliminate those changes that provide margin- 
al return." 
-Thoroughly evaluate the need for a change prior to im- 
"Aviation maintenance is more than 'kicking sailors around'. 
Too many of our maintenance officers seem to think that the 
louder (more intensely) an issue is presented, the more 
logical it is supposed to be. This approach has done great 
harm to many undertakings to bring about improvements in 
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aviation maintenance. The inability of many of the senior 
members of the aviation maintenance community to work suc- 
cessfully within the prevailing bureaucracy has stifled 
meaningful change. 
tour of duty without leaving a mark--many do; also, many 
fight the system rather than the problems; many try to 
change things overnight which doesn't happen; however, the 
prime element is being able to bring about meaningful change 
within the bureaucracy--it can be done with knowledge of 
how the system works, a complete knowledge of problems to 
be resolved and the patience to persist. A rebel without 
a cause is not needed." 
Anyone can float through a bureaucratic 
"Aviation maintenance still has its primary emphasis at the 
depot level because the budget emphasizes depot dollars. 
Intermediate and organizational level maintenance activities 
are buried in other budget line items. For example, com- 
ponent repair receives major emphasis in the depot level 
budget, even though many more items are repaired at the I 
level. As long as senior managers let this continue, OGI 
levels will continue to suffer. I am encouraged with 
respect to personnel quality by seeing higher levels of 
formal education in the junior officers of the 1 5 2 0  commu- 
nity. Hopefully, this will improve our professionalism." 
"We must identify professional growth from entry level 
through middle t o  top management. Our present system does 
not foster this concept. We are always in too much of a 
hurry to take the time to properly indoctrinate, train and 
then to enable our personnel to develop skills, gain con- 
fidence and provide a fair return on our investment. We 
must provide time to practice our skills, to cope with new 
technology, to master our capabilities. We are slaves to 
change and new technology, frequently replacing systems 
that we did not optimize." 
"-OPNAV and NAVAIR take the lead and drive the Type Command- 
ers to standardize. 
-In the real world--each Type Commander does 'his own thing' 
in aviation maintenance. 
-Reduce the number of people/commands required to concur 
on changes . I' 
"Better communications between program managers at the 
Systems Command level. 
Earlier involvement o f  fleet personnel in planning stages 
of changes (requires more travel bucks than most fleet 
activities have now). 
More flexibility to recommendations for change at Systems 
Command level when problems are identified ( a l s o  takes bucks)." 
1 0 2  
"Open up the dialogue between Policy makers and the men in 
the field. Actively seek out new, young ideas and don't 
be afraid of conflict. Use conflict as a change agent, 
i f necessary . 
"A major step to effect change would be to completely iden- 
tify all required elements or facets in the proposed change. 
Then make the proposal work--or if an element falls behind, 
stop the whole change until the delinquent element catches 
up. In this manner we may instill confidence in the in- 
dividuals that will be required to make the change at all 
levels. Once a change is decided upon all echelons must 
implement and practice it." 
"Cull out those with a 'stone-age' approach to management 
and remove the politics within the aviation maintenance 
community . '' 
"Have NAVAIR and NAVSEA work closer together on ship/aircraft 
support problems . ' I  
"Recommend a 1520 Flag in OP 05 organization or designation 
of 1520 captain as spokesman--i.e. by position (OP 514 or 
AIR 580)." 
"Provide adequate funding. 
Decision makers must be thoroughly educated as to the 
Fleet's requirements." 
"The senior 1520 should hold the top maintenance job (OP- 
514) or new flag billet in Washington D.C. Fundamental to 
this is a need for a progression of billets (commander and 
above) which lead to qualification for the top job." 
"Make up a roving QA/New Idea/Problem team (commander, two 
lieutenants, AVCM, AFCM, AZCM) from both TYCOMS and have 
them 'roam' at the direction of CNAP 74 and CNAL 54 through 
both TYCOMS. Meet quarterly and also look/visit fleet 
activities from both fleets (i.e., CNAL team on PACFLT ship 
and vice versa). Don't make them an 'advisory team' with 
check list but a good idea/change team working directly/ 
open door for 74/54. 
experienced people; make it sea duty but no more than 18 
mo. so they don't get burned out; travel first class and 
be treated first class so experienced/professional mainte- 
nance experts will fight to get on the teams. Give them a 
budget with money in it; ensure one of the lieutenants is 
a supply officer; make a cardinal rule that the teams never 
be used as investigators. The payback would be predictably 
high for the investment." 
Make them a mix of young and old 
103 
"Need intelligent 1520 representation in several flag 
officer positions. Need more emphasis on readiness of 
current forces with this emphasis recognizing that this 
is not an overnight event but one which requires careful 
attention throughout the life of a piece of hardware-- 
from conception to retirement." 
"Recommend taking more rapid action on change suggestions 
from the fleet and establishing a feedback report system 
to the originator to let the individual know what is being 
dune. NAVAIR has only recently started a feedback report 
system on Support, Maintenance and Recoverability (SMGR) 
code change requests. It only takes about 6 months to 
find out what's happening now vice the previous method of 
2 to 3 years--or never." 
"Sufficient bucks and bodies t o  f u l l y  support - all elements 
of ILS package prior to fleet in-ction." 
"More knowledoeable decision makers in key positions [at 
higher levels¶. If 
"Greater participation by fleet units in the process." 
"Better passing of information aimed at the maintenance 
personnel. Articles in publications that are read by all. 
Better explanations as to how and why some of the changes 
are made." 
"You should never take one element of logistics without 
considering all of the elements .... The personnel, the 
facilities, the material, the maintenance, yes, all of 
them fit together. Logistics encompasses a l o t ,  and main- 
tenance is one of the logistics elements. I would wish you 
godspeed because somebody needs to l o o k  at the problem, 
but they need to do more than look at it, they need to 
implement something for a change. We keep developing and 
looking at the problem, but we never implement." 
"I sometimes wonder if it is not better to stop doing a 
lot of these changes that we are doing and let the fleet 
catch up with them. We have so many changes that are flow- 
ing down upon our hill until we do not know which one to 
attack first. We need to let it stabilize, and we need to 
make certain our sailors are trained t o  understand what 
they have, and make those changes that are driven by sound 
leadership and sound management principles. 
that today, I can assure you. When you talk about [the 
problems of] logistics philosophies and the life-cycle 
costing and life-cycle management and all of the myriad 
terms that are flowing around--1 hope your study will 
We do not do 
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[highlight problem areas] that we can [present to] the 
highest levels .... I have seen it addressed before, but I 
do not see much coming out of the other end of the pipe. 
I do not see change happening." 
E. SUMMARY 
A questionnaire (Appendix A) was designed to solicit 
Senior Aeronautical Maintenance Duty Officers' (Designator 
1520; captains and commanders) views concerning the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance Change Process. The questionnaire 
requested responses in the following areas: 
--the degree of technological, personnel, and organizational 
change which could be anticipated through the year 2000. 
--evaluation of the current naval aviation maintenance 
environment (including NAMP) as it relates to: Planning 
for Change; Communication; Dealing with Resistance to 
Change; Implementation of Change. 
--evaluation of areas which might be considered impediments 
to change. 
--views concerning methods for improving the current change 
process. 
Responses indicate a strong perception that technology 
will be driving a great deal of change in naval aviation 
maintenance through the year 2000. Perceptions regarding 
changes in personnel resources through the year 2000 reveal 
a predominant expectation that there will be moderate change 
in quality, with little to moderate change in quantity to 
the year 2000. Subjective comments point toward a concern 
for the fact that the quality of maintenance personnel will 
have to increase through recruitment and training in order 
to cope with more technologically sophisticated systems. 
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Concurrent concern is expressed with regard to an expectation 
of declining personnel assets. 
Respondents perceive little change in organizational 
structure within naval aviation maintenance during the next 
10 years, with moderate change occurring 10 to 20 years out. 
Subjective comments indicate that the baseline of three levels 
of maintenance is appropriate; however, budget constraints 
and a need for economies of scale could force consolidation. 
The high level of staff proliferation in existing organiza- 
tional structures, is viewed as a barrier to organizational 
restructuring. 
a perceived need for closer matching of skills to maintenance 
billets. 
Additionally, concern is expressed regarding 
Respondents' views of the current naval aviation environ- 
ment, as it relates to various aspects of the change process, 
indicate that effectiveness in Planning for Change is perceived 
to be weak. 
indicate a need for the following: long-range (strategic) 
planning within naval aviation maintenance; field participa- 
tion in the planning process; greater attention to all elements 
of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS). 
bureaucracy, with its many sub-areas of conflicting responsi- 
bility is considered detrimental to effective planning. 
Subjective comments regarding Planning for Change I -  
Additionally, the 
* 
a Communication as it relates to the change process is con- 
sidered good to fair (top-down) and fair to good (bottom-up). 
Subjective comments indicate concerns with respect to: 4 -  
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decisions being made with little fleet input; communications 
hampered by staff inefficiency; parochialism and ambiguity 
concerning ultimate responsibility; and the need for stream- 
lining the communications system in order to improve the 
upward flow of new ideas. 
Respondents evaluate effectiveness in Dealing with Resis- 
A general perception is that resis- tance to Change as fair. 
tance to change is less of a problem at the fleet level than 
at headquarters levels. 
change exists in the fleet, it is perceived to be the result 
of a profusion of change in logistics and maintenance support 
systems. 
as fair to good, and subjective comments do not reveal trends 
of concern. 
To the degree that resistance to 
Respondents rate the process of change implementation 
Comments concerning respondents' perception of impediments 
to change within the naval aviation maintenance environment 
are divergent; however, some of the more frequently expressed 
concerns focus on the following subject areas: headquarters 
level bureaucracy and an abundance of overlapping organiza- 
tional responsibilities; deficiencies in the utilization of 
MIS and ADP systems; emphasis on short-term solutions at the 
expense of long-term outcomes; budgetary constraints. 
Subjective responses concerning the NAMP cover a wide 
* 
i. range of comment, including the following views: the NAMP 
is an excellent, highly flexible document, well suited to 
change implementation; it is too large to keep updated and 
4 .  
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its size inhibits change; it is too specific and overly 
redundant; the NAMP change process is excessively elongated. 
Recommendations and comments concerning improvement of 
the aviation maintenance change process appear to stress the 
following areas: 
--improvement through "de civilianization" is needed, with 
greater control o f  the decision making process exercised 
by the military. 
--greater attention to the precepts of ILS is required. 
--better manipulation o f  the bureaucracy by insiders to 
ensure orderly change. 
--greater degree of inter-headquarters cooperation (NAVAIR 
and NAVSEA).  
--greater attention to inter-Type Commander standardization 
(AIRLANT and AIRPAC)  . 
--increased involvement of fleet personnel in the change 




V. SUMNARY AND CONCLUSIONS 




A.  SUMMARY 
In fulfilling the Navy's mission, the large-deck carrier 
will most likely remain the prominent platform through the 
year 2000. Further development in V/STOL aircraft technology 
could facilitate greater dispersal of TACAIR, perhaps with a 
mix of large-deck CTOL carriers and smaller CW's, supplemented 
with V/STOL aircraft aboard smaller combatants in an "air- 
capable" Navy concept. Further breakthroughs in aircraft 
design could make other combinations of force structure possible. 
In addition to changes in force structure, technological 
change through the year 2000 will probably include: greater 
use of composite aircraft structures; lighter, smaller, 
higher thrust engines; highly miniaturized VHSIC avionics 
systems; greater use of fly-by-wire systems and BIT capabili- 
ties. In the area of personnel, future demographic trends 
may affect the Navy's ability to attract sufficient numbers 
of high quality personnel to cope with rapidly advancing 
techno logy . 
In the near term, the Navy has been placing greater em- 
phasis on the need for reliability and maintainability in an 
effort t o  improve weapons system readiness. It is envisioned 
that problems of readiness will persist for older systems 
that will remain a part of the inventory for years to come. 




reliability and maintainability are designed into new systems, 
fewer, less highly trained maintenance personnel may be re- 
quired. Maintenance support requirements posed by an air- 
capable Navy of the future will challenge logistics planners. 
This concept will require extensive modification o f  today's 
aircraft support capabilities. 
Preparation for Change through Planning has recently 
been emphasized by CNO through establishment of the Long Range 
Planning Group (OP-OOX) within OPNAV. This group serves in 
an advisory capacity to CNO concerning strategic planning 
matters. 
Within naval aviation, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
(Air Warfare) and the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 
coordinate mid and long-range planning efforts through the 
Naval Aviation Plan. The Plan is made available t o  all ele- 
ments of Naval Aviation in order that mid and long-range 
planning may be better coordinated. 
Within naval aviation maintenance, NAMP planning and 
change requirements are the ultimate responsibility of OPNAV. 
Planning and change processes are effected in an evolutionary 
manner, through a two-tiered committee structure, with s y s -  
tematic viability reassessment handled as a function of the 
NAMP Working Committee. 
It is useful, and sometimes necessary, to step outside an 
organization in order to analyze problems and strengths. It 
is equally useful, and perhaps even more necessary, to seek 
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the opinions of those most closely associated with an organi- 
zation. Aeronautical Maintenance Duty Officer's (Designator: 
1 5 2 0 ;  captains and commanders) views concerning the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance Change Process were therefore solicited. 
Their expectations would indicate that technology will drive 
a great deal of change in naval aviation maintenance through 
the year 2 0 0 0 .  In the area of personnel resources, the pre- 
dominant expectation is that there will be moderate change in 
quality with little to moderate change in quantity over the 
next twenty years. 
Senior level aircraft maintenance managers perceive little 
change in organizational structure over the same period; how- 
ever, budget constraints and a need for organizational economies 
of scale may force consolidation. 
ceived as a barrier to organizational restructuring. 
Staff proliferation is per- 
"Planning for change" is perceived by senior management to 
be generally weak, with a need for: 
planning); increased participation in the planning process; 
greater attention to (ILS). Conflicting areas of responsi- 
bility that exist within the "bureaucracy" are considered 
detrimental to effective planning. 
long-range (strategic 
Concerns expressed with regard to communications center 
around the perception that decisions are being made with little 
fleet input and that communications are hampered by staff 
inefficiency. Additionally, parochialism, ambiguity concern- 
ing ultimate responsibility, and the need to streamline the 
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communications system are expressed as areas of concern. 
"Resistance to change" is perceived to be less of a problem 
a t  the fleet level than at the headquarters level and change 
implementation at the fleet level is considered to be fair 
to good. 
Comments regarding "impediments to change" within the 
naval aviation maintenance environment are divergent, and 
focus on expressions of concern for what are perceived to 
be: overlapping organizational responsibilities; deficiencies 
in MIS and ADP systems utilization; over-emphasis on short 
term solutions; and budgetary constraints. 
The NAMP is considered by some to be an excellent, highly 
flexible document, well suited to "change implementation"; 
while others consider it to be too specific, overly redundant, 
and encumbered by an excessively long change process. 
Comments concerning improvement of the aviation mainte- 
nance change process stress: improvement through "de- 
civilianization"; greater attention to ILS; better manipula- 
tion of the bureaucracy by insiders; greater degrees of 
inter-headquarters cooperation (NAVAIR and NAVSEA) and inter- 
Type Commander standardization (AIRLANT and AIRPAC); increased 
involvement of the fleet in the change process; and 1520 
flag representation in several flag officer positions. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis focuses on a variety of developments that are 




within naval aviation maintenance through the year 2000. 
The structure of sea based maintenance organizations could 
change dramatically should the air-capable Navy become reali- 
ty. 
of aviation maintenance, including revolutionary concepts 
in aircraft structures, engines and avionics. Technology 
will increase the performance characteristics of weapons 
Technology will drive change in virtually every facet 
systems, controlling the complexities it creates through 
improved reliability and maintainability. 
The naval aviation maintenance community has prepared 
well for change through the NAMP evolutionary change process, 
as well as through more recent organizational innovations 
such as the establishment of AIMSO. If the community is to 
become less reactionary as it struggles with the problems of 
rapid technological change, complex weapons systems, computers 
and data processing, increased training requirements, budget 
constraints, and differing priorities; it is imperative that 
it begin now to develop the psychology and the planning 
mechanisms that will place greater emphasis on long-range 
(strategic) planning. This must be done if changes occurring 
today are to be strategically evaluated before implementation 
decisions are made. 
Although a positive, innovative, ''can-do" spirit exists 
throughout the upper echelons of the naval aviation mainte- 
nance community, there is strong evidence of frustration at 
senior levels regarding a perceived need to streamline the 
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"bureaucracy" to ensure both 
o f  responsibility. 
Very volatile expression 
clarity of purpose and clarity 
of concern are cited in this 
thesis regarding the perceived inability of present organi- 
zational structure (i.e. "the bureaucracy"] to prepare for 
and adapt to change. These concerns are more widely held 
than those expressed regarding the community's ability to 
cope with advancing technology (albeit in a reactionary way) 
through the next 20  years. It is therefore subjectively 
concluded that the "bureaucracy", at least in its present 
form, is an encumbrance to effective preparation for change 
within naval aviation maintenance environment. 
A parallel issue is the perceived need for "clarity-of- 
purpose" within the Aeronautical Maintenance Duty Officer 
community. Obviously, the quest for clarity-of-purpose is 
more likely to be successful to the extent that diverse 
approaches and philosophies are more unified, and views more 
broadly shared. Fundamental to the development of purpose 
are enlightened leadership and uninhibited, candid communica- 
tions (up, down, and sideways throughout the community). 
Only when this is accomplished can the understanding that 
breeds common conviction and concerted action be nurtured. 
Clarity - of purpose - and preparation - for change demand 
central leadership, a leadership recognized at all levels, 
as the primary articulator of strategic objectives and com- 
munity concerns, a leadership disciplined by experience in 
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matching aims to the resources necessary to achieve them, a 
leadership unafraid o f  complexity and confident that complex- 
ity can be managed. 
institutionalized can the myriad concerns of senior level 
aircraft maintenance managers be cohesively addressed. 
Not until such a leadership position is 
This thesis has highlighted a host o f  fertile areas for 
Further research might include the fol- directed research. 
lowing areas as they relate to naval aviation maintenance: 
continued exploration of  the naval aviation maintenance 
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APPENDIX A 
QUEST1 ONNAIRE : 
TIfE NAVAL AVIATION MAINTENANCE CIiANGE PROCESS 
1, What degree of technological change., do you expect i n  Naval 
Aviation Maintenance? 
a. Significant change 0 0 
N c x t  10 years 10 to  20 years 
b. Moderate change 







2. What degree o f  Personnel change do you think can be expected i n  
Naval Aviation Naintenance? 
a. Significant change 
b, Moderate change 
c, L i t t l e  change 
a, Significant change 
b. Moderate change 
c. L i t t l e  change 
Comments: . 
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3, In your view, what degree of change to organizational structure 
(both laterally and vertically) can be expected within Naval Aviation 
Maintenance? 
Next I0  peare 
a. Significant change 0 
10 t o  20 years 
0 
b. Moderate change 0 0 
c. Little change 0 0 
Comments: 
4. How do you view the current -Naval Aviation Elaintenance environment 
(including N A W )  as it reiotes to the following facets of the change 
FOCeS8: 






Vertical Comunication (Top - Down) 
outstanding 0 
excellent 0 
k P d  0 
fair 0 
poor 0 
Vertical Communication (Bottom - Up) 





Dealiny with Resistance to Change 
outstanding 0 
b euccellent 0 
good 0 
fair 0 
poor 0 ' 
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. poor 0 
Conmen t s  : 
5. What do you consider to be the impedtrnents to  change within the Naval 
Aviation Maintenance environment? 
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ACMO - Aircraft Maintenance Staffing Standard 
ADP - Automatic Data Processing 
AEW - Air Early Warning 
AFCM - Master Chief Aircraft Maintenanceman 
AIMS0 - Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Support Office 
AIRLANT - Air Atlantic 
AIRPAC - Air Pacific 
I -  
AMP - Analytical Maintenance Program 
ASD (SGL) - Assistant Secretary of Defense (Support and Logistics) 
ASU - Aviation Support Unit 
ASW - Anti-submarine Warfare 
ATE - Automatic Test Equipment 
AVCAL - Aviation Consolidated Allowance List 
AVCM - Master Chief Avionics Technician 
AVT - Auxiliary Aircraft Landing Training Ship 
AWS - Aviation Warfare Specialist 
AZCM - Master Chief Aviation Maintenance Administrationman 
BI'l - Built-in-Test 
CINC - Commander-in-Chief 
CNAVRES - Chief of Naval Reserve 
CNO - Chief o f  Naval Operations 
T 
r 
4 CPPG - CNO's Program Planning Guidance 
. CRT - Cathode Ray Tube 
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CTOL - Conventional Take-off and Landing 
CV - Aircraft Carrier 
CVN - Aircraft Carrier Nuclear 
C W  - Aircraft Carrier Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing 
DASH - Drone Anti-submarine Helicopter 
DCNU - Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 
DOD - Department o f  Defense 
FLIR - Forward-looking Infrared Receiver 
FUNCWING - Functional Wing 
FYDP - Five Year Defense Plan 
GSE - Ground Support Equipment 
HUD - Heads-up Display 
ILS - Integrated Logistics Support 
IMA - Intermediate Maintenance Activity 
LAMPS - Light Airborne Multi-purpose System 
LPH - Landing Platform Helicopter 
LSI - Large Scale Integrated 
MDS - Maintenance Data System 
MIS - Management Information System 
MMP - Maintenance Monitor Panel 
NABIT - Non-Avionics-Built-in-Test 
NAEC - Naval Air Engineering Center 
NALC - Naval Aviation Logistics Center 
NALCOMIS - Naval Aviation Logistic Command Management 
Information System 
NAMP - Naval Aviation Maintenance Program 
NAP - Naval Aviation Plan 
NAVAIR - Naval Air Systems Command 
NAVMASSO - Navy Maintenance and Supply Systems Office 
NAVMAT - Naval Material Command 
NAVSEA - Naval Sea Systems Command 
OPNAV - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
PABST - Primarily Adhesively Bonded Structure 
PPBS - Planning, Programming, and Budget System 
POM - Program Objectives Memorandum 
PQS - Personnel Qualification Standard 
RAF - Royal Air Force 
RCM - Reliability Centered Maintenance 
RDTfiE - Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
SBA - Sea Based Air 
SCS - Sea Control Ship 
SES - Surface Effect Ship 
SHOROC - Shore Required Operational Capabilities 
SIDMS - Status Inventory Data Management Supply Support System 
SLEP - Service Life Extension Program 
SRA - Shop Repairable Assembly 
STOL - Short Take-off and Landing 
STOVL - Short Take-off and Vertical Landing 
TACAIR - Tactical Aircraft 
TAD - Temporary Additional Duty 
TARPS - Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod 





Turn around Time 
Up Front Console 
- Very High Speed Integrated 
VLSI - Very Large Scale Integrated 
Circuit 
V/STOL - Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing 
WRA - Weapon Replaceable Assemblies 
1 2 3  
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